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Abstract
We study urban structures driven by demand and vertical linkages in the presence of increasing
returns to scale. Individuals consume local urban varieties and rms use these varieties to produce
a national good. We prove the existence of a spatial equilibrium and obtain an invariance result
according to which more intense demand or vertical linkages have the same e¤ect on the urban
structure as lower commuting costs. Various urban congurations can emerge exhibiting a mono-
centric, an integrated, a duocentric, or a partially integrated city structure. We discuss the role
of commuting and transport costs, intensities of demand and vertical linkages, and urbanization
in a¤ecting these patterns. We show that multiple equilibria may arise in equilibrium involving
the monocentric city and up to a couple of duocentric and partially integrated structures.
Keywords: Urban spatial structure, demand and vertical linkages, monopolistic competition, land
use
J.E.L.: R12, R14, R31
1 Introduction
In this paper we study spatial urban structures driven by demand and vertical linkages in the presence
of increasing returns to scale. Individuals consume local urban varieties produced by rms under
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monopolistic competition. Firms also use these varieties as intermediate components to produce a
homogeneous national good under perfect competition, which is sold within and outside the city.
Our aim is to study how commuting and transport costs, intensities of demand and vertical linkages,
and urbanization a¤ect the urban structure. For this purpose, we establish equilibrium conditions in
the product and land markets. Our results are the following. First we prove the existence of a spatial
equilibrium and obtain an invariance result according to which more intense demand or vertical linkages
have the same e¤ect on the urban structure as lower commuting costs. We then study several urban
structures and discuss their condition of existence and properties. For the monocentric and integrated
cities, we provide explicit conditions that can be represented in terms of the parameters of interest. As
for duocentric and partially integrated cities, we derive implicit conditions that determine the borders
of business/residential districts. These restrictions on district borders make part of the equilibrium
conditions determining the emergence of duocentric and partially integrated patterns.
Our analysis conrms that a monocentric city emerges for very low commuting costs while spa-
tial integration of business and residential districts occurs when goods are shipped at low transport
costs within the city. As more intense demand or vertical linkages have the same e¤ect as lower
commuting costs, they make the monocentric structure more likely. Furthermore, for intermediate
commuting/transport costs and moderate intensities of demand/vertical linkages, many urban struc-
tures may emerge and coexist in equilibrium. We show the existence of multiple equilibria involving
the monocentric city and up to a couple of duocentric and partially integrated urban structures. Ur-
banization via an increase in city size induces transitions from the monocentric conguration to full
integration possibly passing by duocentric or partially integrated structures depending on the mag-
nitude of the transport cost. When transport costs are high, the economy undergoes discontinuous
transitions reecting larger benets gained by rms when production locations separate into several
business districts.
The present paper extends the existing literature on the endogenous formation of urban areas by
uncovering the role of backward and forward linkages on the formation of cities. Whereas Fujita and
Ogawa (1982) and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) discuss the implications of agglomeration benets
arising from face-to-face communication and exogenous technological spillovers respectively, our paper
studies agglomeration forces that are microfounded in the existence of imperfect competition and rms
increasing returns to scale. Accordingly, rms operating in the city have market power and earn a
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positive prot before proceeding to land rent and labor wage payments. The presence of these internal
increasing returns makes our analysis more appealing in an urban context. As such, our work lls a gap
in the literature. Note that the reduced form of our model encompasses the model structure proposed
by Fujita and Ogawa (1982). Namely, in the absence of demand linkages and prot in the production
of urban varieties, the reduced form of our model is reminiscent to their seminal work. This suggests
that vertical linkages have similar agglomeration e¤ects on the urban structure as those generated by
face-to-face communication and technological spillovers. We therefore conrm the generality of the
latter approaches. As in Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), our paper provides an existence proof of
spatial equilibrium. However, ours is based on Carlier and Ekeland (2007) and applies to Fujita and
Ogawa (1982). Regarding the analysis and computation of multiple equilibria, our approach contrasts
with methods relying on xed point algorithms. We propose an innovative way of determining urban
structures, which consists in determining the borders of potential business/residential districts rst,
and then in checking whether each structure candidate actually constitutes a spatial equilibrium or
not.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses the product and land
markets equilibrium. Section 3 establishes the existence of a spatial equilibrium and the invariance
result between demand/vertical linkages and commuting costs. Section 4 studies various spatial equi-
libria exhibiting a monocentric, an integrated, a duocentric, or a partially integrated city structure.
Section 5 presents numerical computations and results regarding the structure of these urban patterns.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a linear city hosting a continuum of N individuals and N rms along the interval
B [ b; b]  R with unit width. The location supports of individuals and rms are denoted re-
spectively by X and Y, with X [ Y = B. Individuals occupy a unit of residential land, commute to
their workplace, and consume di¤erentiated varieties supplied in the local urban markets as well as an
homogeneous good supplied in the national (i.e. intercity) market. In contrast to the national good,
trade of local varieties incurs iceberg transport costs. These varieties are also used as components
(inputs) to produce the national good. For these two production activities, each rm hires a worker
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and uses s units of land in the production process.
Using the functional form proposed by Püger (2004), an individual residing at x 2 X and working
at z 2 Y is endowed with the utility function
U(x; z) =  ln
Z
Y
c(z; y)
 1
 (y)dy
 
 1
+ c0(x)
where c(z; y) is her consumption at workplace location z of a variety produced by a rm located at
y 2 Y, c0(x) her consumption of the national good at residence location x, (y) the density of rms at
y 2 Y,  > 1 the elasticity of substitution between local varieties, and  > 0 the expenditure intensity
on local varieties. Her budget constraint writes asZ
Y
p(y)c(z; y)e jz yj(y)dy + p0c0(x) + t jx  zj+R(x)  w(z) + c0
where p(y) is the mill price of a local variety produced at y,  the iceberg cost, c(z; y)e jz yj the
quantity of a variety to be purchased at the mill so that consumption is c(z; y), p0 the price of the
national good, t the commuting cost per unit of distance between residence and work places, R(x)
the land rent at the workers residence, w(z) her wage at the workplace, and nally c0 some initial
endowment of the national good.
On the production side, each rm hires a unit mass of workers, each of them supplying a unit
of labor. Each rm simultaneously produces the national good and a single component variety. To
highlight the e¤ect of vertical linkages, we assume that the national good is made of the component
varieties available in the urban markets. For instance, think of a city exporting wood and metal
furniture: woodcraft makers could be exporting wood furniture with steel ornaments made by local
steelmakers while steelmakers would be exporting steel furniture with wood ornaments made by local
woodcraft subcontractors. Similarly, the city of London hosts law rms that use other law rmsand
banksexpertise to provide law services in the national market while banking rms use other banking
and law rmscompetencies to provide national banking solutions. Therefore, the productions of the
national good and local components are integrated within the same plant or o¢ ce. This is because
rms expertise or supervision is too costly to manage over di¤erent plants. Also additional discussion
on outsourcing would bring the model out of focus. Finally, the national good is assumed to be
homogeneous across rms (and cities) and rms are price takers in this market.1 In contrast, each rm
1Product di¤erentiation and imperfect competition in the national market would not add much to our urban structure
analysis.
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is a price setter in the market of its own urban variety.
More specically, production takes place as follows. On the one hand, the national good is made
of local inputs with the output of a rm located at y 2 Y given by the production function
q(y) =  ln
Z
Y
i(y; z)
 1
 (z)dz
 
 1
(1)
where i(y; z) is rm ys local component use of a variety produced by a rm located at z 2 Y and  > 0
the intensity of vertical linkages. Because of iceberg transport costs, rm y purchases i(y; z)e jx yj units
of a variety produced in z and sold at mill price p(z). On the other hand, the rm produces its specic
component using the national good as input. Every component requires  units of the national good.
Therefore, rm ys prot is given by
(y) = p0q(y) 
Z
Y
p(z)i(y; z)e jy zj(z)dz| {z }
national product market
+[p(y)  ]
Z
Y
[c(z; y) + i(z; y)](z)dz| {z }
urban product market
 w(y) sR(y) (2)
In this prot expression, the rst two terms represent the operating prot in the national market (i.e.
revenue minus the cost of inputs), the third term the operating prot in the local component market
(i.e. the component markup times the demand from consumers and rms), and the two last terms the
labor and land costs. The national good is chosen as the numeraire so that its price can be normalized
to p0 = 1.
We now turn to the product market equilibrium where product markets clear.
For this purpose, we consider the locations of rms and individuals as xed. Assuming c0(x) > 0,
the demand for local varieties by an individual residing at y and working at z is given by
c(z; y) = 

p(y)e jz yj
 
P (z)1 
(3)
where the local price index is given by P (z)  RY p(y)1 e(1 )jz yj(y)dy 11  . Her spending on local
varieties is equal to p0 and her demand for the national good is given by c0(x) = [w(z)   t jx  zj
 R(x) + (c0   )].
On the other hand, a rm located at y simultaneous chooses its input mix i(y; ) and its own
component price p(y) that maximize its prot subject to relation (1). Since the rm has a zero mass,
it is too small to inuence the other rmslocal component prices and consumersdemand. Because the
prot in the national market has the same functional form as the individual utility, the optimal input
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mix is equal to i(y; z) = (=) c(y; z) where c(y; z) is given by expression (3). The rms spending on
local varieties is equal to . The operating prot on the national market can therefore be written as
 [ln (=P (y))  1] so that a rm supplies the national market as long as  > P (y). Also, because the
total demand for a local variety produced in y,
R
Y [c(y; z) + i(y; z)] dz, has a constant price elasticity
, the rm sets its component price to p(y) = =(   1) > , which leads to a positive operating
prot in the local component market that turns out to be the same across rms.
The above demand functions and prot-maximizing prices allow us to derive the utility of house-
holds and the prot of rms in the product market. First, the price index becomes
P (z) = 

   1T (z)
where
T (z) 
Z
Y
e(1 ) jz yj(y)dy
 1
1 
(4)
is an access measure of location z corresponding to the aggregate delivery cost from all locations on
Y to location z, which increases with the transport cost  and the dispersion of support Y.
Consumersand rmsdemands for local varieties are given respectively by
c(z; y)

=
i(z; y)

=
   1

e  jz yj
T 1 (z)
(5)
As the demand for the national good is c0(x) = w(z)  t jx  zj  R(x) + (c0   ), the indirect utility
writes as
U(x; z) = 

ln


  lnT (z)

+ [w(z) + c0     t jx  zj  R(x)] (6)
where   1  1= and e is the Euler number. In this expression, the term in the rst squared bracket
represents the net consumer surplus from local urban varieties while the term in the second squared
bracket reects the net consumer surplus from the national good. The latter is indeed equal to the
income left after paying for local urban varieties, commuting cost and land rent. The rms output in
the national market is given by q(y) =  ln (=)   lnT (y).
Using the prot-maximizing price p(y) = =(  1), the gross operating prot from the sales of a
local variety to consumers and rms can be written as
[p(y)  ]
Z
Y
[c(z; y) + i(z; y)](z)dz = ( + )G(y)
where prot G is dened by
G(y)  1

Z
Y
(z)
T 1 (z)
e  jz yjdz (7)
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The expression (2) of the rms prot at location y can then be written as
(y) = 

ln

e
  lnT (y)

+ ( + )G(y)  w(y)  sR(y) (8)
The term in the squared bracket is the prot derived in the national market and the second term that
derived in the market of the local variety. The rm has an incentive to produce the national good
if the former prot is positive, i.e. ln 
e
 lnT (y). This holds if  is su¢ ciently small, which we
assume from now on.2 The third term ( + )G(y) aggregating the operating prots from the sales
of its variety to consumers and rms, increase with the expenditures intensities on local varieties of
consumers () and rms (). Note that this operating prot clearly depends on the rms location y.
We now turn to the land market equilibrium still assuming the distributions of consumers and rms
as given. We assume that land is used either as consumption or rmsinput so that the opportunity
cost of land is nil. In competitive land markets, landowners allocate their plots of land to the highest
bidders (i.e. resident-workers or rms). By using (6), the bit rent of an individual residing at location
x and working at z = z(x) is given by
	r(x) = 

ln

e
  lnT (z)

+ [w(z)  t jx  zj+ c0]  U (9)
where U denotes the utility she can obtain outside the city. Due to free entry and relation (8), as
rm at location y can bid for land up to a level which makes its prot (y) equal to zero, its bid rent
is given by
	b(y) =
1
s



ln

e
  lnT (y)

+ ( + )G(y)  w(y)

(10)
As total land consumption (1 + s)N is equal to the total available land 2b, the city edge is given
by b = (1 + s)N=2.
3 Spatial equilibrium
In this section, we dene and study the spatial equilibrium of our economy where both consumers and
rms exploit spatial arbitrage opportunities. For this purpose, we rewrite the workers and the rms
bid rents as follows. The workers bid rent in location x corresponds to the maximum bid a worker
2That is, if    (1  1=) =(emaxy2YT (y)). Given that maxy2YT (y) > e2b , a su¢ cient condition is  < max 
 (1  1=) e 2b 1.
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can make on a parcel of land in x while receiving a wage from a rm located in y 2 Y willing to hire
her under free entry. Using (9) and (8), we get
	r(x) = max
y2Y;w(y)2R+

 ln

e
   lnT (y) + w(y)  t jx  yj+ c0   U

(11)
s.t. (y) =  ln

e
   lnT (y) + ( + )G(y)  w(y)  sR(y)  0
Similarly, the rms bid rent corresponds to the maximum bid that it can make on a parcel of land
in y while the wage it pays to a worker located in x 2 X induces her to supply her labor to the rm
given her outside utility U. Using (10) and (6)
	b(y) = max
x2X ;w(y)2R+
1
s

 ln

e
   lnT (y) + ( + )G(y)  w(y)

(12)
s.t. U(x; y) =  ln

e
   lnT (x) + w(y)  t jx  yj  R(x) + c0  U
We now make the connection with Fujita and Ogawa (1982). In their seminal paper, urban struc-
tures endogenously emerge from agglomeration e¤ects generated by face-to-face communication be-
tween rmsmanagers and/or employees. This face-to-face communication generates a production
surplus that depends negatively on the logarithm of the average distance between rms. One could
then interpret the parameter expression(   1) in lnT (y) as Fujita and Ogawas parameter for face-
to-face communication. This means that from a reduced form point of view, vertical linkages have
the same role as face-to-face communication in Fujita and Ogawa. However, our vertical linkages also
stem from the production of urban varieties under imperfect competition, which generates a prot
G(y) that is absent in the face-to-face communication model. To sum up, the reduced form of our
model encompasses the structure of Fujita and Ogawa in the absence of demand linkages and prot
from production of urban varieties (that is,  = 0 and G(y) = 0).
The above problems can be solved for the wage so that
	r(x) = max
y2Y

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ ( + )S(y)  t jx  yj+ c0   U   sR(y)

(13)
	b(y) =
1
s
max
x2X

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ ( + )S(y)  t jx  yj+ c0   U  R(x)

(14)
where S(y)  G(y)  lnT (y) is the economic surplus in location y.
We can now dene a competitive spatial equilibrium.
Denition 1 A competitive spatial equilibrium is dened by the residentsand rmsdensity functions
 : B ! [0; 1] and  : B ! [0; 1=s], a land rent R : B ! R+, residentsand rmsbid rent functions
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	r, and 	b : B ! R+ and a utility level U 2 R that satisfy (i) mass conservation
R
B  = N , (ii) land
market clearing (z) = (1  (z))=s for all z 2 B, (iii) land allocation to highest bidder for all z 2 B
 2
8>>><>>>:
f1g if 	r > 	b
[0; 1] if 	r = 	b
f0g if 	r < 	b
and R = maxf	r;	b; 0g, and (iv) zero land rent R at city borders z = b.
3.1 Economic gains and invariance
The urban economic activity generates gains for workers and landlords, rms making zero prot due to
free entry. It is instructive to examine those gains and disentangle the agglomeration force stemming
from demand and vertical linkages from the dispersion force due to transportation, and in particular,
commuting costs.
Consider a worker residing at x and its rm producing at y at the competitive land market equi-
librium. Land rent should correspond to their respective bid rents: 	r(x) = R(x) and 	r(y) = R(y).
Therefore, from (13) or (14), the total gains from their urban economic interaction are
U +R(x) + sR(y) =  ln

e
+  ln

e
+ ( + )S(y)  t jx  yj+ c0 (15)
While the left hand side expresses workersutility and landlordsrents, the right hand side reects
the consumer surplus from local varieties and the producer surplus from both consumers and rms
and from the national market (through terms in  and ). The surpluses are explicitly diminished by
commuting costs.
Observe that the spatial structure (; ) has an impact only on the terms ( + )S(y)  t jx  yj.
This means that it is possible to maintain the same equilibrium spatial structure (; ) by multiplying
both parameters ( + ) and t by the same factor k > 0. To maintain the above equality for all x and
y, equilibrium rents need to be multiplied by this factor k and the equilibrium utility U increased to
the level

k ln k
e
+ k ln k
e

. This heuristic argument is conrmed below in a formal way.
Suppose that a spatial equilibrium exists and denote the mass of commuters moving to the right
and crossing location x by n(x) =
R x
 b [(z)  (z)] dx. In Appendix A, we show that the spatial
9
equilibrium (; ) satises the identity
(z)  (z) 2
8>>><>>>:
f1g if 	b(z) 	r(z) < 0
[ 1
s
; 1] if 	b(z) 	r(z) = 0
f 1
s
g if 	b(z) 	r(z) > 0
(16)
where
	b(z) 	r(z) =
Z z
bz

1
s
( + )
dS
dx
  1 + s
s
t sign (n(x))

dx; (17)
and bz 2 B is a solution to (bz) (bz) = 0 and designates a location where commuting stops or changes
direction. There always exists is at least one such location. Bid rents equate in those locations bz since
workers and rms settle either on the same land plot or on two innitely close residential and industrial
land plot. The rst term in the integral yields the economic surplus S (x) (up to a constant) generated
at location x. The second term reects the travel cost of commuters crossing location x. Of course,
we can use the relationship  = 1  s to eliminate a density prole either  or .
The above identity tells that workers and rms settle in the locations where they respectively place
the highest bid rents. When they o¤er the same bid, any share of rms and residents is possible. In
this competitive allocation, the spatial equilibrium depends on the sign of the bid rent di¤erentials but
not on their amplitudes. Hence multiplying both the parameters ( + ) and t by any scalar k > 0 has
no e¤ect on the sign of the bid di¤erentials and therefore is compatible with the spatial equilibrium
structure. This yields the following main result:
Proposition 1 Cities with a same parameter ratio ( + )=t have an identical spatial structure.
The ratio shows that stronger demand or vertical linkages and higher commuting costs have opposite
e¤ects on the urban structure. The economic surplus generated by any pair of worker and a rm is
balanced with the commuting cost between the workers residence and her rm. A proportional
increase in the intensity of demand or vertical linkages and in commuting cost does not change this
spatial balance though each e¤ect becomes more intense. As a result, stronger linkages have the same
impact as lower commuting costs.
3.2 Existence
Relationships (16) and (17) dene a xed point problem for the rmsspatial distribution. Indeed,
the rmsdensity  determines the values of the surplus S which in turn determines . In Appendix
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B, we show the existence of a xed point using Shauders theorem.
Proposition 2 A spatial equilibrium exists.
The proof of spatial equilibrium existence relies on the determination of the stock of commuters
owing over each urban location, n(x). This is referred as the stock of unhoused workersby Lucas
and Rossi-Hansberg (2002). As shown in (16), the main di¢ culty in establishing the existence of
spatial equilibrium lies in the discontinuity of the land allocation process across rms and workers.
As in Carlier and Ekeland (2007), we rst show the existence of a xed point for smoother land
allocation processes by replacing (16) by an equation where the land allocation decision across rms
and workers is a continuous function of their bid rent di¤erential 	b   	r. In economic terms, this
may be interpreted by the presence of exogenous uncertainty in landlordschoices. We then prove the
convergence of those xed points to that dened by (16) and (17) for less and less smooth allocation
processes. Using the same interpretation, the xed point takes place at the limit of zero uncertainty
in the land allocation process. It must be noted that the above existence result applies to Fujita and
Ogawas (1982) model which lacks a general existence proof and displays parameter values for which no
equilibrium could be constructed. As mentioned earlier, their equilibrium conditions are structurally
the same as ours if one sets  and G to zero and interprets (   1) as a parameter for face-to-face
communication.
4 Urban structures
Our existence result in Section 3 says nothing about uniqueness of equilibrium. In this section, we
present and discuss a variety of urban structures and determine their condition of existence.
4.1 Monocentric city
We consider the business district Y = [ b1; b1] surrounded by the residential districts X = [ b; b1)[
(b1; b], see Figure 1 (a). The densities of rms and households are (y) = 1=s and 1 respectively. The
business district edge is given by b1 = sN=2. In the monocentric city, workers commute from the
residential district to the business district.
11
The monocentric equilibrium conditions are as follows: (i) rms outbid households in the business
district (	b(y)  	r(y) for all y 2 Y), (ii) households outbid rms in the residential district (	r(x) 
	b(x) for all x 2 X ); (iii) the residential and the business bid rents equalize at the business district
border (	b(b1) = 	r(b1)); (iv) the zero opportunity cost of land at the city border b requiring	r(b) = 0.
As of expressions (4) and (7), we dene the surplus at location z as SM(z)  GM(z)   lnTM(z),3
where the access measure TM and the prot GM are given by
T 1 M (z) =
1
s
Z b1
 b1
e(1 ) jy zjdy (18)
GM(z) =
1
s
Z b1
 b1
e  jy zj
T 1 M (y)
dy (19)
Proposition 3 The monocentric conguration is a spatial equilibrium if and only if
t  tM = min(btM ; tM)
where
tM =
 + 
1 + s
SM(0)  SM(sN=2)
sN=2
and btM   + 
1 + s
SM(sN=2)  SM((1 + s)N=2)
N=2
When s! 0, tM = ( + ) N < btM .
Proof. Given the symmetry of the city, our analysis focuses on the right side of the city [0; b].
Under linear commuting costs, workers can arbitrage between the di¤erent workplaces. As a result,
a rm located at y must o¤er individuals a wage w(y) that is as attractive as that available in other
work locations. Denoting U0 by  [ln (=e)  lnTM(0)] +w(0) + c0, we can write the following wage
arbitrage condition for any 0  y < x:


ln

e
  lnTM(y)

+ w(y) + t y + c0 = U0
so that the equilibrium wage w(y) satises
w(y) = U0   

ln

e
  lnTM(y)

  t y   c0
By using this wage expression, the households bid rent (9) can then be written as
	r(x) = (U0   U)  t x (20)
3The surplus SM (z) corresponds to the prot in the market of a local variety accounting for the cost of accessing all
components in order to produce the national good.
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Similarly, the rms bid rent (10) writes as
	b(y) =
1
s

 ln

e
+  ln

e
  U0 + c0

+ ( + )SM(y) + t y

(21)
At the land market equilibrium, landlords reap the surplus derived by rms and households.
As the district border is given by b1 = sN=2, we need to impose conditions (i), (ii), (iii), and
(iv) on the bid rent functions (20) and (21) of residents and rms. It is shown in Appendix C that
conditions (i) and (ii) reduce to (i) 	b(0)  	r(0) and (ii) 	r(b)  	b(b) respectively.
Condition (i) 	b(0)  	r(0) can be rewritten as
1
s

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ c0   U0

+
1
s
( + )SM(0)  (U0   U) (22)
The equilibrium conditions (iii) and (iv) (	b(b1) = 	r(b1) and 	r(b) = 0) determine U0 and U. In
particular, we have
U0 =

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ c0

+ ( + )SM(b1) + (1 + s) t b1   s t b
By plugging the above expression of U0 into (22) and using b1 = sN=2,we get
t  tM  2( + )
(1 + s) sN
[SM(0)  SM(b1)] (23)
When s! 0, we have
lim
s!0
tM =   ( + ) lim
s!0
SM(sN=2)  SM(0)
sN=2
=
( + ) 
N
Furthermore, we also have
	b(b) =
1
s

( + )SM(b) + t b+

 ln

e
+  ln

e
  U0 + c0

=
1
s

( + ) [SM(b)  SM(b1)] + (1 + s)N t
2

so that the condition (ii), 	b(b)  	r(b) = 0, can now be rewritten as
t  btM  2( + )
(1 + s)N
[SM(b1)  SM(b)] (24)
Gathering expressions (23) and (24) leads to t  min(btM ; tM).
When s! 0, we get
lim
s!0
[lnTM(sN=2)  lnTM((1 + s)N=2)] =  N=2
lim
s!0
[GM(sN=2) GM((1 + s)N=2)] = 1  e
 N=2

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Therefore
lim
s!0
btM  2( + ) lim
s!0
[SM(sN=2)  SM((1 + s)N=2)]
= 2( + ) lim
s!0
[GM(sN=2) GM((1 + s)N=2)  lnTM(s=2) + lnTM((1 + s)N=2)]
= ( + )

2
1  e N=2

+ N

> ( + )N = lim
s!0
tM
so that lims!0 btM < lims!0 tM .
Proposition 3 says that lower commuting costs favor the monocentric conguration as they allow
residents to commute longer distances to the business district. Larger nal demand or vertical linkages
also make the monocentric conguration more likely as they increase the operating prot in the market
of local varieties due to increasing returns to scale, thus allowing rms in the business district to pay
higher wages and making people more willing to commute.
Figure 2 illustrates the shape of bid rents in a monocentric city. The rmsbid rent curve, rep-
resented in red, is above (resp. below) the residentsbid rent curve (in blue) around the city center
(resp. the city edge). Bid rents are equal to the zero opportunity cost of land at the city border and
intersect at the location y = 0:5, which separates business and residential districts. Workersbid
rents are linear in the distance to the center as longer commutes are compensated by lower rents. As
rms benet from agglomeration economies, their bid rent is endogenous and depends on the location
of other rms. Typically it is non-linear in the distance to the city center. A priori, it is not obvious to
guarantee a single intersection between bid rents. Nevertheless, according to the above Proposition, it
turns out that only the bid rent properties at the city center and border matter. While the condition
t  btM guarantees that rms do not overbid workers at the city border (	b(b)  	r(b)), the condition
t  tM guarantees that they are not overbid by residents at the city center (	b(0)  	r(0)).
The last statement in Proposition 3 implies that, even if the manufacturing sector makes no use
of land (s ! 0), the monocentric city structure may not be a spatial equilibrium. This qualies the
standard discussion based on the monocentric city model where rms are assumed to be located in a
city business center using no space. This paper highlights the role of the trade-o¤ between workers
commuting cost and goodstransport costs.
Finally, note that, when transport costs vanish ( ! 0), the economic surplus SM(z) becomes
location independent and the above thresholds become tM = btM = 0. Then, the monocentric city is
never a spatial equilibrium for any commuting cost t > 0. In this case, the demand for nal goods
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and intermediate goods demand is unrelated to space. There is no agglomeration force and spatial
concentration brings no benet.
4.2 Integrated city
We consider rms and households locating in X = Y = [ b; b], see Figure 1 (b). Given the unit
demand for land of households and the s unit demand of rms, the density of rms is (y) = 1=(1 + s)
and the city edge is still at b = (1 + s)N=2. The integrated conguration involves no commuting.
The integrated equilibrium conditions are as follows: (i) the business and residential bid rents
equalize (	r(z) = 	b(z), 8z 2 X = Y); (ii) the no-arbitrage relocation implying j	0r(z)j  t; (iii) the
zero opportunity cost of land at the city border b requiring 	(b) = 0.
As of expressions (4) and (7), we dene the surplus at location z as SI(z)  GI(z)  lnTI(z) with
the access measure TI and the prot GI given by
T 1 I (z) =
1
1 + s
Z b
 b
e(1 ) jz yjdy (25)
GI(z) =
1
 (1 + s)
Z b
 b
e  jy zj
T 1 I (y)
dy (26)
Proposition 4 The integrated city is a spatial equilibrium if
t  tI =   + 
1 + s
S 0I(b) > 0
When s! 0, tI = ( + )S 0I(b).
Proof. As before, we focus on [0; b]. We need to impose the above conditions (i)-(iii) on the bid
rent functions. The equilibrium condition (i), 	r = 	b, leads to
w(y) =
1
1 + s
(s  ) lnTI(y) +  + 
1 + s
GI(y) + C (27)
where C  s=(1 + s) fU   c0    ln[=(e)] + =s ln [=(e)]g.
From equilibrium condition (iii), 	(b) = 0, we have


ln

e
  lnTI(b)

+ w(b) + c0   U = 0 (28)
From relations (27) and (28), the constant C can be determined
C =
s
1 + s
( + )SI(b) +  ln

e
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By plugging the wage expression (27) into (10) (or (9)), we get the equilibrium land rent
R(z) =
 + 
1 + s
[SI(z)  SI(b)]
According to the no-arbitrage condition (ii), an urban conguration is an equilibrium if workers have no
incentive to commute to any other location, i.e., if jR0(z)j = ( + )=(1 + s)S 0I(z)  t, for 8z 2 [0; b].
In Appendix D, it is shown that
S 0I(z)  S 0I(b), 8z 2 [0; b], so that the no-arbitrage condition
reduces to jR0(b)j = ( + )=(1 + s)S 0I(b)  t.
Proposition 4 states that higher commuting costs foster the integrated conguration. Intuitively,
very large commuting costs entice workers to take residence as close as possible to their workplace.
Also, weaker nal demand or vertical linkages make the integrated conguration more likely. They
indeed decrease the operating prots from the production of local varieties, which reduces workers
wages, and in turn the incentives to commute. Finally, it turns out that tI is an increasing function of
 (see Appendix D). So, lower trade costs enlarge the domain of economic parameters for which rms
integrate with residents. For lower trade costs, input costs depend less on distance between rms and
vertical linkages lead to a weaker agglomeration force for the rms. Therefore, rms do not benet
much from clustering with other rms and make land rent bids that can be matched by workers.
Figure 3 illustrates the shape of bid rents in an integrated city. The rmsand the residentsbid
rent curves coincide at any location in the city. Bid rents vanish at the city borders due to the zero
opportunity cost of land. As workers do not commute, rents do not reect linear commuting costs but
rather non-linear agglomeration economies coming from demand and input-output linkages. In the
above Proposition, the equilibrium condition t  tI guarantees that each worker has no incentive to
accept a job away from her residential location. This property obtains if bid rents from are not too
steep. It is ensured as long as demand and input-output linkages are weak enough (low  + ).
When the transport cost becomes negligible ( ! 0), the economic surplus SI(z) is location in-
dependent so that S 0I(z) = 0 and tI = 0. The integrated city is then a spatial equilibrium for any
commuting cost t > 0. In this case, the demands for nal goods and intermediate goods are indepen-
dent of space and the agglomeration force vanish.
Finally, we prove the following corollary:
Corollary 1 For s! 0, the monocentric and the integrated urban congurations never coexist. That
is, tM < tI .
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Proof. See Appendix E.
When the manufacturing sector makes no use of land, a high commuting cost is compatible only
with the integrated structure. This results from the tension between backward and forward linkages
and commuting costs. When backward and forward linkages are too weak, rms are unable to post
land bids that are high enough to foreclose the workers to reside close to them. The above result forbids
the possibility of multiple equilibria, where the monocentric and integrated structures coexist for the
same set of parameter values. To the best of our knowledge, this property is not well emphasized in
the literature (e.g. Fujita and Ogawa 1982, and followers).
4.3 Partially integrated city
Next, we consider a city where workers and rms locate with each other in the central district ( b1; b1),
which is surrounded by business districts ( b2; b1) [ (b1; b2), themselves bordered by residential
districts ( b; b2) [ (b2; b), see Figure 1 (c). The density of rms is  (y) = s=(1 + s) in the interval
( b1; b1) and (y) = 1=s in the intervals ( b2; b1)[ (b1; b2), while that of workers is (x) = 1=(1 + s)
in the interval ( b1; b1) and (x) = 1 in the intervals ( b; b2)[ (b2; b), with 0 < b1 < b2 < b. Because
the total mass of rms is N , we get
2 (b2   b1) 1
s
+ 2b1
1
1 + s
= N
that is,
b2 =
b1
1 + s
+
sN
2
(29)
The partially integrated equilibrium conditions are as follows: (i) the bid rents of households and
rms equalize in the integrated district (	r(z) = 	b(z), 8z 2 ( b1; b1)); (ii) no-arbitrage relocation
in the integrated district implying j	0(z)j  t, 8z 2 ( b1; b1); (iii) rms outbid households in the
business districts (	b(y)  	r(y) 8y 2 [ b2; b1][ [b1; b2]); (iv) households outbid rms in residential
districts (	r(x)  	b(x), 8x 2 [ b; b2][ [b2; b]); and (v) the zero opportunity cost of land at the city
border b requiring 	r(b) = 0.
As of expressions (4) and (7), we dene SP (z)  GP (z)   lnTP (z) where the access measure TP
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and the prot GP are given by
T 1 P (z) =
1
s
Z  b1
 b2
+
Z b2
b1

e(1 ) jz yjdy +
1
1 + s
Z b1
 b1
e(1 ) jz yjdy (30)
GP (z) =
1
s
Z  b1
 b2
+
Z b2
b1

e  jz yj
T 1 P (y)
dy +
1
 (1 + s)
Z b1
 b1
e  jz yj
T 1 P (y)
dy (31)
Proposition 5 The partially integrated city is a spatial equilibrium if and only if
btP  t  tP
where the thresholds btP and tP are given by
btP   + 
1 + s
max
z2[0;b1)
jS 0P (z)j ; tP  min

tP ;etP	
with etP   + 
1 + s
SP (b2)  SP (b)
b  b2 ; tP  miny2[b1;b2]
 + 
1 + s
SP (y)  SP (b2)
b2   y
The district borders (b1; b2) satisfy
t =
 + 
1 + s
SP (b1)  SP (b2)
b2   b1 (32)
where b2 is given by (29) and 0 < b1 < b2 < N .
Proof. As before, we focus on [0; b]. In the integrated district of the city, condition (i) writes
R(z) = 	r(z) = 	b(z). From expressions (9) and (10), we get
R(z) =
 + 
1 + s
SP (z) +
1
1 + s

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ c0   U

; z 2 [0; b1) (33)
w(z) =
s  
1 + s
lnTP (z) +
 + 
1 + s
GP (z)
  s
1 + s

 ln

e
  
s
ln

e
+ c0   U

; z 2 [0; b1) (34)
In the residential district, we have R(x) = 	r(x); x 2 [b2; b]. However, since the residential bid rent
	r(x) given by (9) is independent of the workplace y in business district [b1; b2], it can be written as
R(x) = 	r(x) = A  tx; x 2 [b2; b]
where
A = 

ln

e
  lnTP (y)

+ w(y) + ty + c0   U; y 2 [b1; b2]
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is constant with respect to y. Condition (v) says that the land rent is nil at b, from which we get
A = tb. So, from the last two expressions, we can write the equilibrium land rent in the residential
district and the wage in the business district as
R(x) = t(b  x), x 2 (b2; b] (35)
w(y) = t (b  y)  

ln

e
  lnTP (y)

  c0 + U; y 2 [b1; b2] (36)
Inserting the wage (36) into R(y) = 	b(y) as given by relation (10) yields the land rent in the business
district
R(y) =
1
s

( + )SP (y)  t (b  y) +  ln 
e
+  ln

e
+ c0   U

; y 2 [b1; b2] (37)
As land rents are continuous, R(b1   0) = R(b1 + 0) and R(b2   0) = R(b2 + 0), we get
U = ( + )SP (b2)  t (1 + s) (b  b2) +  ln 
e
+  ln

e
+ c0
and
( + ) [SP (b1)  SP (b2)] = t (1 + s) (b2   b1)
which is equation (32) and determines b1 as b2 is given by relation (29).
We still have to impose conditions (ii), (iii), and (iv). First, condition (ii) ensuring no commuting
within any two locations in the integrated district writes as
( + ) jS 0P (z)j  t (1 + s) , z 2 [0; b1)
that is,
t > btP   + 
1 + s
max
z2[0;b1)
jS 0P (z)j (38)
Second, condition (iii) says that rms outbid workers in the business district: R(y)  	r(y) 8y 2
[b1; b2]. Subtracting (35) from (37), we get
( + ) [SP (y)  SP (b2)]  t (1 + s) (b2   y) , y 2 [b1; b2]
which gives
t  tP  min
y2[b1;b2]
 + 
1 + s
SP (y)  SP (b2)
b2   y (39)
Finally, condition (iv) ensuring that workers outbid rms in the residential district (R(x)  	b(x),
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8x 2 [b2; b]) gives
( + ) [SP (b2)  SP (x)]  t (1 + s) (x  b2)  0, x 2 [b2; b] (40)
which is similar to relation (39). Only signs and supports di¤er. Note that in the interval (b2; b), SP (x)
is convex because G00P (x) = 
2 2GP > 0 and (lnT 1 P (x))
00 = 0: Since the LHS of inequality (40) is
zero at x = b2, this inequality is satised for all x 2 [b2; b] if and only if
( + ) [SP (b2)  SP (b)]  t (1 + s) (b  b2)  0
Thus, inequality (40) is equivalent to
t  etP   + 
1 + s
SP (b2)  SP (b)
b  b2 (41)
To sum up, the spatial equilibrium is given by (b1; b2) that solve equations (29) and (32) and satisfy
(38), (39), and (41).
Proposition (5) shows the partially integrated conguration can only exist for intermediate values
of the commuting cost. It also makes explicit the condition that district borders need to satisfy. By
inspection of equation (32), the commuting cost from b2 to b is to be proportional to the surplus
di¤erence between locations b1 and b2.
Figure 4 illustrates the shape of bid rents in a partially integrated city. Panel a) presents the case of
balanced use of space, where rms and workers use the same amount of land (s = 1). Around the city
center, rms and residents populate an integrated district where the rmsand the residentsbid rents
coincide. This integrated area is surrounded by two business districts where rms outbid residents.
Residential districts emerge at city edges where residents outbid rms. The condition t  btP ensures
su¢ ciently high commuting cost so that workers have no incentive to commute within the integrated
district. The economic intuition is similar to that prevailing in the integrated city. The condition
t  etP guarantees that residents outbid rms in peripheral districts. In particular it expresses the
su¢ cient condition that rms producing at y = b2 have no incentives to relocate production at the city
edge y = b. Firms indeed balance the e¤ects of such a relocation on their revenues and wage bills. On
the one hand, they lose revenues at the city edge because of the lower access to their customers. On
the other hand, they pay lower wages at the city edge because workers need not be compensated for
long commuting. The latter e¤ect gets smaller and is dominated by the former when commuting costs
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become lower. To sum up, partially integrated cities therefore exist only for intermediate commuting
costs and, by Proposition 1, only for intermediate values of demand and input-output linkages.
We provide two Corollaries exhibiting additional properties of partially integrated equilibria. The
rst property relates to the contiguity and intersection of the sets of parameters supporting the inte-
grated and the partially integrated cities. In particular, we show that the partially integrated city is
a spatial equilibrium for t = tI    and  > 0 small enough.
Corollary 2 The parameter sets that support the integrated and the partially integrated cities do not
intersect and are contiguous.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The second property is about the existence of partial integrated cities even when rms do not use
space. The literature generally extends Alonsos (1964) model to multiple business centers located
on points (e.g. Fujita, Krugman and Mori 1999). The following corollary suggests that, although
insightful, this strategy does not cover the exhaustive set of urban congurations. Indeed, consider
innitesimally small business districts (s ! 0). By Corollary 1, the commuting cost interval (tM ; tI)
is not empty. For such commuting costs, monocentric and integrated city structures are not spatial
equilibria. In the following corollary, we show that spatial equilibria include partially integrated cities
when businesses use no land.
Corollary 3 Suppose rms use an innitely small amount of land (s ! 0). Then, there exists a
partially integrated equilibrium with an integrated district surrounded by two innitely small business
districts and residential districts in the periphery when commuting costs satisfy maxftM ;bt0Pg  t 
min
n
tI ; t
0
P ;et0Po.
Proof. Towards this aim, we rewrite equation (32) as
t = fs(b1)   + 
1 + s
SP (b1)  SP (b2)
b2   b1
where b2 is given by (29). As s! 0, one can verify
lim
s!0
fs(0) = tM and lim
s!0
fs (b) = tI
Because tI > tM > 0 and fs(b1) is continuous in [0; b=2], we can apply the intermediate value theorem.
There exists at least a value of b01 that solves t = fs(b1) for all t 2 (tM ; tI). One then computes the
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thresholds
et0P = ( + ) SP (b01)  SP (b)b  b01
t
0
P =   ( + )S 0P (b01)bt0P = ( + ) max
z2[0;b01)
jS 0P (z)j
Then, if bt0P  t  minnt0P ;et0Po, there exists a partially integrated equilibrium with two innitely small
business districts at y = b01:
Panel b) in Figure 4 presents a second example of bid rents in a partially integrated city where the
use of space is unbalanced. In such a case, rms do not use much space unlike residents and business
districts have a very small spatial extent (s = 0:01). Additional numerical exercises show that the
city conguration remains identical as s! 0: In that case, the two business districts become so small
that the central integrated district becomes contiguous to the peripheral residential districts. The
parameters fulll the conditions of the above corollary, which therefore determine non-empty sets of
parameters. To sum up, the partially integrated city exists even in the absence of space requirement
by rms. So, although very insightful, previous discussions on city subcenters concentrated on spatial
points do not encompass the full set of urban congurations.
4.4 Duocentric city
Here, the city consists of two business districts Y = [ b3; b1) [ (b1; b3] and three residential districts
X = [ b; b3)[[ b1; b1][(b3; b], see Figure 1 (d). Households living in [ b; b3) commute to [ b3; b2),
those living in [ b1; 0) to [ b2; b1), those living in [0; b1] to [b1; b2), and those living in (b3; b] to [b2; b3).
Given the total masses of rms and consumers, we have
b1 =
1
s
(b2   b1) ; b  b3 = 1
s
(b3   b2) (42)
The density of rms is (y) = 1=s on Y and district edges satisfy b2 = (1 + s) b1 and b3 = b1 + sN=2.
As before, we focus on [0; b].
The duocentric equilibrium conditions are as follows: (i) rms outbid households in the business
districts (	b(y)  	r(y) for all y 2 Y); (ii) households outbid rms in the residential districts (	r(x) 
	b(x) for all x 2 X ); (iii) the business and the residential bid rents equalize at district borders
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(	r(b1) = 	b(b1) and 	r(b3) = 	b(b3)); and (iv) the zero opportunity cost of land at the city border
requiring 	r(b) = 0.
As of expressions (4) and (7), we dene SD(z)  GD(z)   lnTD(z), where the access measure TD
and the prot GD are given by
T 1 D (z) =
1
s
Z  b1
 b3
e(1 ) jz yjdy +
Z b3
b1
e(1 ) jz yjdy

GD(y) =
1
s
Z  b1
 b3
e  jz yj
T 1 D (z)
dz +
Z b3
b1
e  jz yj
T 1 D (z)
dz

Proposition 6 The duocentric city is a spatial equilibrium if and only if
t  max(btD; tD)
	b(y)  	r(y) for all y 2 Y
where btD   + 
1 + s
SD(b1 + sN=2)  SD(0)
(1 + 2s) b1   sN=2 and tD 
 + 
1 + s
SD(b1 + sN=2)  SD(b)
N=2  b1
with b1 2 (0; N=4] satisfying
t (N   4b1) (1 + s) s=2 = ( + ) [SD(b1)  SD(b1 + sN=2)] (43)
Proof. As in earlier sections, workers arbitrage between the di¤erent workplaces up to their
commuting cost and land rent payments. As a result, a rm located at z must o¤er individuals a wage
w(z) that is as attractive as in other workplaces. Since workers commute from the left and right hand
sides of the business district located on (b1; b3), it is convenient to denote the business center of the
business district by b2 2 (b1; b3). This is the unique location where a rm attracts workers from each
side of its location. Since the labor market divides about y = b2, the left hand sides labor demand
and supply balance so that b2   b1 = sb1 while its right hand side clears so that b3   b2 = s (b  b3).
Denoting the utility of a worker working at b2 by U2   [ln (=e)  lnTD(b2)] +w(b2) + c0; we can
write the following wage arbitrage condition for any y  0:


ln

e
  lnTD(y)

+ w(y) + t jy   b2j+ c0 = U2
so that the equilibrium wage w(y) satises
w(y) = U2   

ln

e
  lnTD(y)

  t jy   b2j   c0 (44)
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This is also the wage that a rm should pay to attract a worker when it relocates in a residential
district.
By plugging the wage expression into (9) and setting y = b2, the households bid rent can be
rewritten as
	r(x) = U2   U   t jx  b2j
Similarly, the rms bid rent (10) writes as
	b(y) =
1
s

 ln

e
+  ln

e
  U2 + c0

+ ( + )SD(y) + t jy   b2j

Landlords reap the surplus of the production and consumption of each pair of individuals and rms
up to the level of the individuals utility.
As before, we focus on [0; b] when imposing the equilibrium conditions (i)-(iv) on the bid rents
from households and rms. Using the wage (44) from the wage arbitrage condition and applying it for
x > b3 > y > b2, one can express the relations 	r(b) = 0 and 	r(b3) = 	b(b3) as functions of U2, U, b2
and b3. Using the same wage (44) and applying it for x < b1 < y < b2, one can also express the relation
	r(b1) = 	b(b1) as function of the same variables. Therefore, conditions (iii) and (iv) together with
the identities b2 = (1 + s) b1 and b3 = b1 + sN=2 provide ve equations for the ve variables U2, U,
b1, b2 and b3. The solution for U2 and U is given by
U2 =

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ c0

+ ( + )SD(b1) + t (b2   b1)  st (b  2b2 + b1)
U =

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ c0

+ ( + )SD(b1)  (1 + s) t (b  2b2 + b1)
while b1 solves (43).
The equilibrium inequality condition (ii) 	r(x)  	b(x) for all x 2 X , writes as
	r(x) 	b(x) = U2   U   1
s

 ln

e
+  ln

e
  U2 + c0 + ( + )SD(x)

  1 + s
s
t jx  b2j  0
where SD(x) can be shown to be convex on the intervals (0; b1) and (b3; b): S 00D = G
00
D   11 
 
lnT 1 D
00
where G00D = 
2 2GD > 0 and (lnT 1 D )
00 =
h
(T 1 D )
00T 1 D   (T 1 D )0
2
i
=T
2(1 )
D ; the last expression is
equal to 0 on (b3; b) and to

2(   1)=(sT 1 D )
2 R  b1
 b3 e
(1 )(y z)dz
R  b1
 b3 e
(1 )(z y)dz > 0 on (0; b1).
Then, 	r(x)   	b(x) is concave on those two intervals. Since 	r(b1)   	b(b1) = 0, we have 	r(x)  
	b(x)  0 for all x 2 (0; b1) if and only if 	r(0)   	b(0)  0, which can be rewritten as t btD  ( + )[SD(b3)   SD(0)]=[(2b2   b3) (1 + s)]. Similarly, since 	r(b3)   	b(b3) = 0, we have
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	r(x)   	b(x)  0 for all x 2 (b3; b) if and only if 	r(b)   	b(b)  0, which can be rewritten
as t  tD  ( + ) [SD(b3)   SD(b)]= [(b  b3)(1 + s)]. This means that condition (ii) reduces to
t  max(btD; tD). The equilibrium inequality condition (i) remains as it is: 	b(y)  	r(y) for all
y 2 Y.
Finally, it can easily be shown that b1 should not exceed N=4. Otherwise, the residential bid rent
would be negative at x = 0.
To understand, the equilibrium condition in Proposition (43),we rewrite it as
t (b3   b2)  t (b2   b1) =  + 
(1 + s) s
[SD(b1)  SD(b3)]
The LHS corresponds to the di¤erence in the commuting cost to workplace b2 from district borders
b3 and b1, while the RHS is proportional to the surplus di¤erence between locations b3 and b1. This
means that these commuting costs and surplus di¤erences should balance.
Figure 5 illustrates the shape of bid rents in a duocentric city. Residential districts are located
at the city center and peripheries where the residentsbid rent (in blue) is above the rmsbid rent
curve (in red). In between these residential districts, two business districts gather rms outbidding
residents. Panel a) and b) of Figure 5 show two di¤erent duocentric city structures for the same set
of economic parameters, for which equation (43) accepts two solutions. It can be checked on Figure 5
show that 	b(y)  	r(y) for all y in the business districts. So, this means that multiple duocentric
equilibria can arise.
In Proposition 6, the endogenous border b1 is the solution to (43), which accepts no closed-form
solution. Proposition 6 also imposes the bid rent condition 	b(y)  	r(y), for any location y in the
business districts Y. As the purpose will be to determine the duocentric congurations by use of
numerical computations, we shall replace the condition 	b(y)  	r(y), for all y 2 Y, by the necessary
condition 	b(b2)  	r(b2), which is equivalent to t  etD where
etD   + 
1 + s
SD(b2)  SD(b1)
b2   b1
Note that we did not nd any example where this condition was not also su¢ cient. So, the threshold
value of the commuting cost is given by
t  tD = max(btD; tD;etD)
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5 Numerical analysis
The theoretical analysis of urban structures in the previous section allows us to determine and study
the nature of city structures in terms of economic parameters. Given the complex nature of duocentric
and partially integrated congurations, we determine them by numerical computations. This is done
in two steps. First, given some xed parameter values, district borders are determined by solving (43)
and (42) for the duocentric conguration (resp. (32) for the partially integrated conguration). Note
that up to two roots are found in either case. Second, additional restrictions reecting rent conditions
at district borders are imposed. The role of these restrictions is to retain only the candidates that
actually lead to an equilibrium conguration.
Equilibrium city structures Figure 6 gathers the central results of our numerical analysis. It
presents the equilibrium structures derived in Propositions 3, 4, 5, and 6 in the plane of transport
and commuting costs (; t) for xed values of other parameters, i.e.  =  =  = s = 1 and
 = 3. The gure displays the monocentric "m", the integrated "i", the partially integrated "p",
and the duocentric "d" congurations. The concatenation of several letters indicates the presence of
multiple equilibria with di¤erent urban structures for the same set of parameters. For instance, "mdd"
indicates the co-existence of a monocentric equilibrium and two di¤erent duocentric equilibria. For
some parameter congurations, up to four equilibria can co-exist (see "dmpp" at the center of Figure
6). In Section 2, existence of a spatial equilibrium was proved. Indeed, numerical computations always
deliver at least an equilibrium for any point in (; t) plane. This contrasts with Fujita and Ogawa
(1982) where some parameter congurations were shown to support no equilibrium.
Figure 6 displays the curve corresponding the threshold tM below which parameters support the
monocentric city. The monocentric city arises only if commuting costs are relatively low. By denition
of tM , residents and businesses make the same land bid at the city center for any value of t lying on
the curve tM . For slightly higher commuting costs -and as long as transport costs are low enough-,
residents are willing to match the rmsbid rent at the city center. Some residents and rms can then
gather at the city center, while many other workers are still willing to commute. Hence the curve tM
refers to a transition between the monocentric and the partially integrated congurations.
Figure 6 also displays the curve corresponding to the threshold tI above which parameters support
the integrated city. In the integrated city, residents work and reside in the same location. By denition
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of threshold tI , when commuting costs equate tI , some individuals are indi¤erent between working at
their residence location and commuting to a rm located further away. For commuting costs slightly
below tI , residents located at the city border have an incentive to commute and choose a workplace
between the city center and the city border, so that a partially integrated city structure emerges. Hence
the curve tI refers to a transition between the the partially integrated and the integrated congurations.
The partially integrated conguration exists only for intermediate commuting costs. Consider such
a partially integrated structure. When the commuting cost rise becomes too high, the business centers
and the residential peripheries shrink, and ultimately vanish when the commuting cost reaches the
threshold tI . Hence the partially integrated conguration converges smoothly to the integrated city.
For low transport costs (i.e., when only one partially integrated equilibrium exists), the two business
centers get closer to each other to nally join each other as the commuting cost approaches tM from
above: the partial integrated structure then converges smoothly to the monocentric conguration. For
higher transport costs (i.e., when the partially integrated and the monocentric cities co-exist), one par-
tially integrated conguration converges continuously to the monocentric structure as the commuting
cost approaches tM from below.
Duocentric cities are equilibria only for high transport costs and intermediate commuting costs
(see the right-hand side of Figure 6). Indeed, when shipping goods are costly, rms benet from
clustering their production activities in two separate business centers so as to decrease the average
distance to suppliers and consumers. Consider commuting costs rising from zero (i.e., a rising path in
the right-hand side of Figure 6). When commuting costs are very low, workers accept long journeys
to their workplace and benet from a concentrated business district, i.e. the monocentric pattern
"m". However, when commuting costs reach intermediate values, an urban structure with two activity
centers becomes benecial to them because long commutes can be avoided. When this happens, two
duocentric congurations emerge (see transition from "m" to "mdd" in Figure 6). As commuting costs
keep on increasing, one duocentric conguration persists while the other disappears (transition from
"dmd" to "dm"). Finally, for even higher commuting costs, the remaining duocentric city pattern
ceases to exist as households want to locate closer to their workplace, which gives rise to a transition
to a partially integrated conguration.
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Multiple equilibria Figure 6 also illustrates the multiplicity of equilibria. In many regions of
the parameter space, a unique equilibrium emerges (see "m", "i", "p" and "d"). There are also large
sets of parameters for which several structures among the monocentric, the duocentric, or the partially
integrated congurations co-exist. Note that all structures can co-exist for a narrow set of parameter
values. The fully integrated structure cannot co-exist with any other conguration. As mentioned
in the above paragraph, multiple equilibria can involve di¤erent urban structures of the same type:
either two partially integrated structures like in "mpp" and "dmpp" or two duocentric structures like
in "dmd" and "mdd". This can only happen for intermediate commuting costs. For higher commuting
costs, one of the two equilibria always disappears. It is interesting to describe how two equilibria of the
same type emerge. When commuting costs increase, it can be shown that the transition from "m" to
"mpp" (resp. from "m" to "mdd") implies that the monocentric city keeps the same structure while a
partially integrated city (resp. a duocentric city) initially emerges and immediately separates into two
distinct partially integrated structures (resp. a duocentric) with business centers evolving at di¤erent
locations.
Welfare ranking Importantly, the ordering of letters in Figure 6 indicates the ranking of equi-
libria in terms of aggregate welfare (i.e., the sum of residentsutility plus aggregate land rents). For
instance, the ordering "mdd" indicates that the monocentric conguration has the highest welfare
while the two duocentric congurations have lower and distinct welfare values. The welfare ranking
can be obtained from Figure 7, which plots the aggregate welfare in terms of the transport cost for
nine values of commuting cost. The top left panel shows that for t = 0:2, the aggregate welfare falls
with higher transport costs as they indeed reduce consumption and therefore prots, wages and utility.
The panel shows continuous welfare transitions between the integrated, the partially integrated and
the monocentric cities as transport costs rise. For high transport costs, two duocentric congurations
emerge but yield lower welfare levels. The next two top panels show that for higher commuting costs
t = 0:32 and 0:56 respectively, duocentric structures can bring higher welfare. The central panel illus-
trates equilibria and the welfare ranking for t = 0:64: two partially integrated equilibria rank below
the monocentric city equilibrium. In the next panels, commuting cost are so high that the monocentric
conguration is not part of equilibria. It can be observed that the duocentric city abruptly emerges
as commuting costs increase and yields a higher aggregate welfare.
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Population growth Finally, we look at the impact of urbanization on spatial structures by
considering gradual increases in the city size N for given commuting and transport costs. According
to our numerical analysis, three cases arise depending on transport costs  .
(i) For low transport costs  , transitions are smooth. The conguration is initially monocentric for
small N (i.e. t < tM), then it becomes partially integrated for intermediate N (i.e. tM < t < tI).
(ii) For intermediate transport costs  , the conguration is initially monocentric. Then it bifur-
cates into either a partially integrated or duocentric city. These patterns are quite di¤erent from the
monocentric city so that the transition is discontinuous, the resulting path being undetermined. In
the case of a duocentric city, it will partially integrate at a later stage, and will nally approach full
integration.
(iii) For large transport costs  , the conguration is initially monocentric. When it bifurcates, it
becomes a duocentric city. Then, it becomes partially integrated, and nally fully integrated. Figure 8
plots this case with  = 3 and t = 0:7 for an increasing population N . It shows that the conguration
is initially monocentric (black). When it breaks, it becomes duocentric (red), and then partially
integrated (blue).
These results show that transitions are continuous (resp. discontinuous) for small (resp. large)
transport costs. This reects the fact that when transport costs are large, rms can gain more when
rms locate in several business districts.
6 Conclusion
We have studied urban structures driven by demand and vertical linkages in the presence of increasing
returns to scale, which in contrast to the existing literature on the topic, are internal to the rm.
Existence of equilibrium has been proved and an invariance result has been obtained regarding the
equivalent role of more intense demand and vertical linkages and lower commuting costs. Various
urban congurations can emerge in equilibrium exhibiting a monocentric, an integrated, a duocentric,
or a partially integrated city structure. We have discussed the role of commuting and transport costs,
intensities of demand/vertical linkages, and urbanization in a¤ecting these patterns. We have nally
presented a numerical approach to discuss the emergence of multiple equilibria.
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Appendix A: Equilibrium conditions
Let B = [   b; b], b 2 R+0 , be the support of the city. The densities of residents and rms are given
by  : B ![0; 1] and  : B ![0; 1=s]. The land market clearing imposes that  + s = 1 while labor
market clearing imposes that the mass of workers is equal to mass of rms
R
B  =
R
B  = N . With the
city border b  N(1 + s)=2, every worker and every rm nd a job match. So, we just need to imposeR
B  = N .
While workers bid rent is the maximum bid a worker makes on a parcel of land as of (13), the rms
bid rent is the maximum bid that it can make on land as of (14). The necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for spatial equilibrium are given by identities (16) and (17). Remind that S(y) = G(y)  lnT (y), where
T (y) =
R
B e
(1 ) jz yj(z)dz
 1
1  and G(y) = 1

R
B
e  jz yj
T 1 (z) (z)dz. Note that G, T and therefore S :
B !R+ are integrals and therefore continuous functions of y. Functions G and T are also strictly
positive because their integrands are positive as  has positive measure.
No cross commute At every location, the ow of commuters is unidirectional. The proof can be
found in Ogawa and Fujita (1980, Property 1). The authors show that workers commuting in opposite
directions have no incentives to cross each other in equilibrium.
City edges Spatial equilibrium involves workers residing at city edges. Suppose this is not the
case: (b) = 0 and (b) = 1=s: Then, there would be workers at x < b facing a positive land rent and
commuting to a rm located at b. These workers would benet from relocating to b + , with  > 0
innitely small, because of a zero land rent and an innitely small commuting cost t, which violates
equilibrium. The same argument applies at x =  b.
More generally, spatial equilibrium involves more residents than rms at city edges. Otherwise,
(b) < (b), and the above argument still applies as there would be workers at x < b facing a positive
land rent and commuting to a rm in b, who would benet from relocating to b+, with  > 0 innitely
small.
Lemma 1 City edges host more residents than rms:  > 0;    for z = b.
Land rent continuity The bid rents 	r and 	b are the maximum values of programs (13) and
(14), which involve not only the continuous functions S and jj, but also the land rent function R which
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is not a priori continuous. Therefore, the Maximum Theorem cannot be applied in order to show the
continuity of bid rents 	r and 	b. Instead, the continuity of bid rents is shown by the fact that they
are linear functions of the land rent R.
Lemma 2 The bid rents 	r and 	b in (13) and (14) are continuous functions B ! R. So 	r   	b
and R = maxf	r;	b; 0g are also continuous functions B ! R.
Proof. Indeed, each bid rent can be written as the function 	(x) = maxz f1(x) +f2(z) +f3(x  z),
where f1 : B ! R and f3 : [ 2b; 2b]! R are continuous functions and f2 : B ! R is not necessarily a
continuous function. For 	 = 	r, take f1 = 0, f2 =  ln

e
+  ln 
e
+ ( + )S + c0   U   sR and
f3(x  z) =  t jx  zj. For 	 = 	b, take f1 = ( ln e +  ln e + ( + )S + c0   U)=s, f2 =  R=s
and f3(x   z) =  t jx  zj =s. Remember that S is a continuous function. In contrast, the land rent
R is not a priori a continuous function. Let y and y0 be the maximizers of 	 respectively at x and x0.
By the denition of a maximum, we have 	(x) = f1(x) +f2(y) +f3(x  y)  f1(x) +f2(y0) +f3(x  y0)
and 	(x0) = f1(x0) + f2(y0) + f3(x0   y0)  f1(x0) + f2(y) + f3(x0   y). Using the conditions, we have
f3(x  y0)  f3(x  y)  f2(y)  f2(y0)  f3(x0   y0)  f3(x0   y) (45)
Then, we compute the di¤erence
	(x) 	(x0) = f1(x)  f1(x0) + f2(y)  f2(y0) + f3(x  y)  f3(x0   y0)
and therefore
f2(y)  f2(y0) = 	(x) 	(x0)  (f1(x)  f1(x0))  (f3(x  y)  f3(x0   y0))
Plugging this in (45), we get
f1(x)  f1(x0) + f3(x  y0)  f3(x0   y0)  	(x) 	(x0) = f1(x)  f1(x0)  f3(x0   y) + f3(x  y)
Then, because f1 and f3 are continuous functions, limx0!x jf1(x)  f1(x0)j = 0 and limy0!y jf3(x  y0)  f3(x0   y0)j =
limx0!x jf3(x0   y)  f3(x  y)j = 0, we have that limx0!x j	(x) 	(x0)j = 0.
Commuting ows Let n : B !R be the number of commuters owing in the right hand direction
(i.e. toward positive x). Since there is no resident and no rm at the left of x =  b and at the right of
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x = b, we have n(b) = 0. This ow increases with the mass of residents who start their commuting
trip in the right direction and decreases with the mass of rms that hire commuters located on their
left:

n =   . Given the denition of spatial equilibrium, we have

n 2
8>>><>>>:
f1g if 	r > 	b
[ 1
s
; 1] if 	r = 	b
f 1
s
g if 	r < 	b
(46)
Given the absence of cross commuting, a location is a sourceof commuters if

n > 0 and a sinkof
commuters if

n < 0. The ow of commuters points to the right direction (x < y) when n > 0 and to
the left direction (x > y) if n < 0. By the rst fundamental theorem of calculus, the ow of commuters
n(z) =
R z
 b

ndz is a continuous function. At city edges, because    at z = b, we have n(b)  0.
Also, when

n(b) > 0, the function n is equal to 0 at least twice in order to satisfy n(b) = R b b ndz = 0.
It is useful to introduce some terminology about the sets of sources and sinks of commuters moving
to right or left direction. Let the set of sources S = fz 2 B : n > 0 and n > 0g and the set of sinks
(destinations) D = fz 2 B : n < 0 and n > 0g where  = 1 if commuters ow to the right direction
and  =  1 otherwise. For example, S1 includes source locations of commuters owing to the right
direction and S 1 those owing to the left direction. Obviously, commuters departing from S and
arriving in D ow to the right direction (resp. the left direction) if  = 1 (resp.  1). Locations that
are neither origin nor destination of commuters dene the set P = fz 2 B : n = 0g. Locations that
involve a change in commuting direction are denoted by the set Q = fz 2 B : n = 0 and n 6= 0g.
Because n is a continuous function and either

n > 0 or

n < 0 for z 2 Q, any location z 2 Q has zero
measure, i.e. it is an isolated point. Finally, note that those denitions determine six disjoint sets:
D+1, D 1, S1, S 1, P and Q.
We now study the land rent properties on these sets.
Wage arbitrage in S [ D. Consider two disjoint, open and convex intervals, S 0  S and
D0  D, such that (i) workers residing in S 0 commute to rms located in D0 and labor ows in the
same direction within each interval (S 0 \D0 = ?). Since n (x) and n (y) have the same sign for x 2 S 0
and y 2 D0, one readily checks that jx  yj = (y   x) sign(n (x)) = ysign(n (y))   xsign(n (x)) where
sign(n) = 1; 0; 1 depending on whether n is positive, zero, or negative. Since n has the same sign
in each interval, each function sign(n) is a constant. The rst order conditions for the maximum
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problems (13) and (14) are given by
( + )

S   t sign(n)  s

R = 0, y 2 D0 (47)
t sign(n) 

R = 0, x 2 S 0 (48)
While the rst identity includes only residents irrespective of their workplaces, the second one involves
only rms irrespective of workersresidences. These identities apply for any innitesimal interval where
workers start to commute in the same direction and rms hire from the same side of the city. Since
these conditions hold for all S 0  S and D0  D, they hold a.e. in S and D, where a.e. (almost
everywhere) means for all points except on a zero-measure set.
Lemma 3 The land bid rent di¤erential is given by

	b  

	r =
1
s
( + )

S   1 + s
s
tsign(n); a.e. z 2 S [ D
Proof. Consider again the two disjoint, open and convex intervals S 0  S and D0  D. Then,
conditions (47) and (48) imply that the equilibrium land rent R is equal to workersand rmsbid
rents. Applying the envelope theorem to (13) and (14) yields

	r = t sign (n) ; x 2 S 0

	b =
1
s

( + )

S   t sign (n)

, y 2 D0
We construct the highest losingbids 	r on D0 and 	b on S 0. We rst look at the set S 0. Because
workers depart from their residence x 2 S 0 to work, they must reside on S 0 and win the land market
competition. Because workers reside in S 0, her bid 	r must be equal to the equilibrium land price R.
Consider then a rm that would produce at x 2 S 0 and hire a resident at x0 2 S 0. Because of (48), any
resident in S 0 has the same incentive to work in the rm. So, we can say that the rm hires a worker
residing at x0 = x. The rms highest (losing) bid 	b is given by (14) evaluated at y = x. Using this,
the bid rent di¤erential writes as
	b  	r = 1
s

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ ( + )S + c0   U

  1 + s
s
R (49)
Di¤erentiating this expression and using (48), we have the bid rent di¤erential

	b  

	r =
1
s
( + )

S   1 + s
s
t sign (n) , z 2 S 0 (50)
33
which holds for any S 0 in S, and thus for any measurable set in S.
We then look at the set D0. Because D0 hosts rms, it must be that 	b = R. Consider a resident
who would choose to reside at y 2 D0 and be hired by a rm in D0. Because of (47), the worker is
indi¤erent to any rm producing at y0 2 D0, so that we can focus on the case where the hiring rm
produces at y0 = y. The workers highest (losing) bid is given by (13) evaluated at x = y. The bid
rent di¤erence writes as
	b  	r =  

 ln

e
+  ln

e

  ( + )S   c0 + U + (1 + s)R (51)
Di¤erentiating this expression and using (48), we get the bid rent di¤erential

	b  

	r =
1
s
( + )

S   1 + s
s
t signn; y 2 D0
which holds for any D0 in D, and thus for any measurable set in D.
Wage arbitrage in P. Consider a location z 2 P, which is neither a source nor a sink of
commuters. Since there is no empty hinterland, this location must host both workers and rms, so
that land market clearing imposes R = 	b = 	r. So,
R =
1
1 + s

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ ( + )S + c0   U

; z 2 P
Furthermore, let

P be the interior set of P so that z 2

P is not an isolated point in P. Then, we
have

R =

	r =

	b =
1
1 + s
( + )

S, z 2

P
and

	b  

	r = 0, z 2

P (52)
Bid rent di¤erential at city borders. The zero opportunity cost of land imposes R = 0 at
the city border z =  b. By Lemma 1, there must be workers with residences at z =  b so that the
highest bid is that of workers: 	r = R = 0 at z =  b. The edge location z =  b also belongs to
the set S1 since ( b) > 0 and workers there cannot commute to the left direction. We can therefore
apply (49) and get the land rent di¤erential
	b  	r = 	b = 1
s

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ ( + )S + c0   U

; z =  b (53)
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Equilibrium condition We summarize the above results as follows. Let us dene  : B ! R,
 (z) =
1
s
( + )

S (z)  1 + s
s
t sign(n (z)) (54)
Note that

n and  may not be continuous in z. However  is bounded because

S is bounded.
A spatial equilibrium is dened by the rent di¤erential function	b 	r and the commuting function
n such that 	b  	r is continuous everywhere on B, 	b  	r = 	b and n  0 = n at z 2 f b; bg, and
z 2 S [ D )

	b  

	r =  (z) a.e.
z 2 P )

	b  

	r = 0 a.e.
(55)
Remind that Q has zero measure and therefore is not a¤ected by the above implications.
Lemma 4 A spatial equilibrium is such that
z 2 S [ D ()  (z) 6= 0 a.e.
z 2 P ()  (z) = 0 a.e.
Note that any equilibrium commuting function n has two possible patterns: it is either such that

n = n =  = 0, 8z 2 B (fully integrated city) or such that the city space is partitioned with n > 0
for some source locations z and

n < 0 for some sink locations z. In the latter case, we have  > 0 for
some z and  < 0 for some other z. This means that  always accepts a zero. Let Z be the set of
zeroes or changes in the sign of , Z = fz 2 B : lim"!0  (z + ")   (z   ")  0g.
Then, the spatial equilibrium is given by the function n : B ! R, which is the solution to

n(z) 2
8>>><>>>:
f1g if  (z) < 0
[ 1
s
; 1] if  (z) = 0
f 1
s
g if  (z) > 0
with

n  0 = n at z = b and  (z)  R zbz2Z  (x) dx: Using n(x) = R x b (  ) dz yields condition (16)
in the text.
Invariance To check invariance, one can replace t and (+) by et = mt and (e+ e) = m(+);
m 2 R0. This yields e (n) = m (n), which gives the same set of roots bZ = fz 2 B : e (n) = 0g =
fz 2 B :  (n) = 0g. As a result, the sign of e (n) is the same as that of  (n), and thus, the
equilibrium must be the same. We therefore have invariance with respect to changes in parameters as
long as ( + )=t remains constant.
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Appendix B: Existence of a spatial equilibrium
Formulation of a xed point
We denote the set of continuous functions on B =[ b; b] by C0(B) and the set of functions with con-
tinuous rst derivative by C1(B). To formulate the xed point problem, we work with the commuting
ow function n which is continuous: that is, n 2 N where N  fn 2 C0(B) : n( b) = n(b) = 0,

n 2 [ 1=s; 1] a.e.g where a.e. means almost everywhere, that is everywhere except on a zero measure
set. We also use a concise notation for operators where Mn expresses the application of operator
M : N ! C0(B) on a function n 2 N and Mn (z) expresses the value returned by Mn at z 2 B.
We redene the economic surplus as the operator S : N ! C1(B) and its slope

S : N ! C0(B)
so that Sn (z) = Sn ( b) + RB Sn(x)  1fz>xgdx where 1fAg is the indicator function that returns 1 if
A is true and 0 otherwise. Then, we denote the rent di¤erential by 	 : N ! C0(B), (	) (z) =R
B
 
	b  

	r

 1fz>xgdx. Using the value for

	b  

	r in (54) and (55), integrating from z =  b, and
using rent di¤erential (53) at this location, we get
	n (z) =
1
s

 ln

e
+  ln

e
+ c0   U

+
1
s
( + )Sn (z)  1 + s
s
t
Z z
 b
sign(n (x))dx
We rewrite the bid rent di¤erential in a more compact form as
	 =
1
s
( + 0   U)
where the operator  : N ! C0(B) is dened by  = ( + )S   (1 + s) tL, the operator L : N !
C0(B) by Ln(z) = RB sign(n (x))  1fz>xgdx, and the scalar 0 by s ln e +  ln e + c0.
A spatial equilibrium is then dened by the function n : [ b; b] ! R and the scalar U which are
the solutions to

n 2
8>>><>>>:
f1g if n+ 0   U < 0
[ 1
s
; 1] if n+ 0   U = 0
f 1
s
g if n+ 0   U > 0
(56)
with

n  0 = n at z = b.
We now formulate the xed point problem in terms of the continuous function n rather than the
discontinuous function

n. Towards this aim, we integrate the previous condition (56). To take care
of the three subconditions, we dene the correspondence F : R! [ 1=s; 1] such that F (z) =  1=s if
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z < 0, F (z) = [ 1=s; 1] if z = 0, and F (z) = 1 if z > 0. We dene the functional U : N ! R that for
any function n, gives the scalar U that solves
0 =
Z
B
F [U   0   n (z)]dz
and the operator O : N ! N 0,
(On) (z) =
Z
B
F [Un  0   n (x)]  1fz>xgdx (57)
The denition of U guarantees that n(b) = 0 while n( b) = 0 is trivially satised. By construction,
the operator O returns a function n such that

n 2 [ 1=s; 1]. So, O maps N into itself.
Lemma 5 The existence of a spatial equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a xed point n 2 On.
Sequences of xed points
The Schauder theorem applies on a set of continuous mappings of continuous functions. So, we
use continuous approximations of F and sign functions and then prove convergence. We dene the
continuous, di¤erentiable and strictly increasing functions Fk : R ! [ 1=s; 1], k 2 N, such that Fk
converges to F as k ! 1 and 0 < F 0k  k, and the continuous, di¤erentiable and strictly increasing
function Hl : R ! [ 1; 1], l 2 N, such that Hl converges to sign as l ! 1 and 0 < H 0l  l.
In particular, we consider logistic functions with images on [ 1=s; 1] and [ 1; 1]: Fk(z) =  1 +
(1 + s) = [1 + exp( 4kz= (s+ 1)] and Hl(z) =  1 + 2= [1 + exp( 2lz)]. The type of convergence will
be dened formally below.
We use the subset of continuous functions N and the sup norm knk1 = supz2B jn(z)j. We dene
the operators l and Ll : N ! C0(B) by
ln (z) = ( + )Sn (z)  (1 + s) tLln(z)
Lln(z) =
Z
B
Hl(n (x))  1fz>xgdx
Furthermore we dene the functional Ukl : N ! R as being the solution U to
R
B Fk[U   0  
ln (x)]dx = 0 and the operator Okl : N ! N by
Okln(z) =
Z
B
Fk[U

kln  0   ln (x)]  1fz>xgdx
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Note that Ukl is a unique solution because Fk is strictly increasing.
Our strategy is to prove the existence of xed points nkl to n

kl = Okln

kl 8k; l 2 N and prove that
the limit n = limk!1 liml!1 nkl satises n
 = On. We rst prove that the set N is a closed convex
set in the Banach space C0(B) and the mapping Okl is well dened and continuous.
Lemma 6 The set N is a closed convex set in the Banach space C0(B).
Proof. The space C0(B) is a vector space of continuous scalar functions on the real compact
interval B =[ b; b] for the operation of addition and scalar multiplication. It is equipped with the sup
norm knk = supz2B jnj. Every Cauchy sequence fnkg1k=1 with nk 2 N converges to some function
n 2 N : It is thus a Banach space. The set of continuous functions N = fn 2 C0(B) : n( b) = n(b) =
0;

n 2 [ 1=s; 1]g is closed and convex. Indeed, any convex combination n + (1   )m, n;m 2 N ,
belongs to N . It is also closed because every sequence fnkg1k=1 with nk 2 N converges to some n 2 N .
We now check that Okl is a well-dened continuous mapping. We remind that an operator is well
dened if it actually maps its domain into the dened set of images. An operator M : X ! Y , with
X; Y 2 C0(B), is a continuous mapping if for all  > 0, there exists k > 0 such that for any n;m 2 X;
kn mk1 < 1=k ) kMn Mmk1 < . It must be noted that the composition of continuous
mappings is also a continuous mapping. Also, the convolutionM : X ! Y ,Mn(z) = RB f(z x)n(x)dx
is a continuous mapping for any bounded valued function f : R! R, jf j <1.
Lemma 7 S is a well dened continuous mapping.
Proof. We rst prove the following useful statement: An operator M : N ! C0(R), Mn(z) =R
B f(x; n)g(x   z)

n(x)dx is a continuous mapping when we consider f : B N !R as a continuous
function in m with bounded image (i.e. jf j < fmax) and g : R!R+ with bounded image (i.e. jgj <
38
gmax). We indeed successively get
kMn Mmk1 = sup
z2B
ZB f(x; n)g(x  z) n(x)dx 
Z
B
f(x;m)g(x  z) m(x)dx

= sup
z2B

R
B f(x; n)g(x  z)

n(x)dx  RB f(x;m)g(x  z) m(x)dx
  RB f(x; n)g(x  z) m(x)dx+ RB f(x; n)g(x  z) m(x)dx

 sup
z2B
ZB f(x; n)g(x  z)
 
n(x)  m(x)

dx
+ ZB [f(x;m)  f(x; n)] g(x  z) m(x)dx

 fmaxgmax
ZB
 
n(x)  m(x)

dx
+ gmax ZB [f(x;m)  f(x; n)] m(x)dx

Note that
R
B
 
n(x)  m(x)

dx =
R b
 b dn(x)  
R b
 b dm(x) = n(b)   n( b)   [m(b) m( b)] = 0 since
n(b) = m(b) = 0 for any n;m 2 N . Also, for any m 2 N , one has that m 2 [ 1=s; 1] and therefore m  maxf1; 1=sg. Using this,
sup
z2B
ZB [f(x;m)  f(x; n)] m(x)dx
  maxf1; 1sg 
ZB [f(x;m)  f(x; n)] dx

 maxf1; 1
s
g  2b sup
z2B
jf(z;m)  f(z; n)j
Finally, by continuity of f , for any  > 0; there exists  > 0 such that km  nk <  implies
jf(z;m)  f(z; n)j <  for all z, or equivalently, supz2B jf(z;m)  f(z; n)j < . Thus, for any 0 we can
use the same  such that km  nk < ) kMn Mmk1 < 0 where we set  = 0= [2bgmax maxf1; 1=sg].
This proves the continuity of M .
Second, the operator T 1  : N ! C0(R) with T 1 n(z) = RB e(1 ) jz xj(x)dx is a well-dened
continuous operator. Indeed, using  =

1  n

=(1 + s), we have T 1 n(z) =
R
B e
(1 ) jz xjdx=(1 +
s)   RB e(1 ) jz xj ndx=(1 + s). The rst term is independent of n. Regarding the second term,
just set f(x; n) = 1 and g (z   x) = e(1 ) jz xj, which have bounded images for x; z 2 B. The
operator is well dened as it returns continuous functions having images in a strictly positive range:
T 1 n (B)  (2be(1 )2b= (1 + s) ; 2b=s). For the highest bound, we simply plug n =  1=s in the rst
line of the above expression. For the lowest bound, we compute T 1 n(y) =
R
B e
(1 ) jz yj 1  n(z)
1+s
dz 
e(1 )2b
R
B
1  n(z)
1+s
dz = 2be
(1 )2b
1+s
> 0 where we use jz   yj < 2b in the inequality and RB ndz = 0 in
the last equality. Therefore, 1= [T 1 n(x)] is also a continuous function having images in a strictly
positive range while ln [T 1 n(x)] is a continuous functions having real bounded images.
Third, the operator G : N ! C0(R) with Gn (z) = 1

R
B
e  jz xj
(T 1 n)(x)(x)dx is a well-dened contin-
uous operator. Indeed, one just has to set f(x; n) = 1= [T 1 n(x)] and g (z   x) = e  jz xj in the
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above statement. It is clear that the operator returns a function with bounded positive images.
Finally, since S = G  lnT = G+ 1
 1 lnT
1 , it is a linear combination of well dened continuous
operators. Thus, we can conclude that S : N ! C0(B) is a well-dened continuous mapping.
Lemma 8 Ll is a well-dened continuous mapping.
Proof. For any  > 0; we must nd  such that km  nk1 <  ) kLln  Llmk1 < . We
successively get
kLln  Llmk = sup
z2B
ZBHl(n (x))  1 (z > x) dx 
Z
B
Hl(m (x))  1fz>xgdx

= sup
z2B
ZB [Hl(n (x)) Hl(m (x))]  1fz>xgdx

= sup
z2B
ZB [n (x) m (x)]H 0l (p(x))  1fz>xgdx

where p(x) 2 [min(n (x) ;m (x));max(n (x) ;m (x))] by the mean value theorem and the continuity and
the di¤erentiability of Hl. Using the fact that H 0l  l and that n( b) = m( b) = 0, we have
kLln  Llmk1  l sup
z2B
Z z b [n (x) m (x)] dx

 l sup
z2B
Z z
 b
jn (x) m (x)j dx
= 2bl sup
z2B
jn (z) m (z)j
= 2bl kn mk
So, for any , choose  < =l. Therefore, Ll : N ! C0(B) is a continuous mapping. Since Hl has
image on [ 1; 1], the image of Ll lies in the interval [ 2b; 2b]. So, it is well dened.
Since l : N ! C0(B) is composition of well-dened continuous mappings with bounded images,
it is also a well dened continuous mapping. We nally need to show the corresponding result for Okl
which depends on Ukl.
Lemma 9 Ukl is a well-dened continuous functional.
Proof. For readability we here temporarily write Ukl as U . Then, U : N ! R is the unique
solution to
R
B Fk[U   0   ln (x)]dx = 0 because Fk is strictly increasing. Also, it is clear that the
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solution U must lie between minx2B [0 + ln (x)] and maxx2B [0 + ln (x)]. Since ln has bounded
image, Un has also bounded images and is well dened.
Let us consider two commuting functions n and m : N ! R. Let also pmin and pmax : N N ! R
be the minimum and the maximum functions of Un ln and Um lm. By the mean value theorem
and the di¤erentiability of Fk, we have
Fk[Un  0   ln (x)]  Fk[Um  0   lm (x)] = F 0k(p(x))  [Un  ln (x)  Um+ lm (x)]
where p : B ! R such that p 2 [pmin, pmax]. This yields
F 0k(p(x))  (Un  Uklm) = Fk[Un  0   ln (x)]  Fk[Um  0   lm (x)]
+ F 0k(p(x))  [ln (x)  lm (x)]
Integrating, applying
R
B Fk[U   0   ln (x)]dx = 0 to n and m, and subtracting expressions, we
get
(Un  Um) 
Z
B
F 0k(p(x))dx =
Z
B
F 0k(p(x))  [ln (x)  lm (x)]dx
Since F 0k > 0, we have
jUn  Umj =
R
B F
0
k(p(x))  [ln (x)  lm (x)]dxR
B F
0
k(p(x))dx

R
B F
0
k(p(x))  jln (x)  lm (x)j dxR
B F
0
k(p(x))dx

R
B F
0
k(p(x))  supz jln (z)  lm (z)j dxR
B F
0
k(p(x))dx
= sup
z
jln (z)  lm (z)j
= kln  lmk1
In other words Un is a continuous mapping of ln. Since ln is a continuous mapping of n, Un is also
a continuous mapping of n.
Lemma 10 For any k; l 2 N, Okl : N ! N is a continuous mapping.
Proof. The operator Okl is dened by
Okln(z) =
Z
B
Fk[U

kln  ln (x)]  1fz>xgdx (58)
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where Ukln was discussed in the previous lemma. By construction, the image functions m 2 Okln are
continuous and satisfy m( b) = m(b) = 0 and m 2 [ 1=s; 1]. The operator Okl is well dened as it is
a mapping N ! N .
For readability we temporarily dispense Ukl and Okl with the subscripts kl and superscript . Using
the mean value theorem and the di¤erentiability of Fk and p dened in the previous lemma, we get
kOn Omk1 = sup
z2B
ZB fFk[Un  ln (x)]  Fk[Un  ln (x)]g  1fz>xgdx

= sup
z2B
ZB F 0k(p(x))  [Un  ln (x)  U(m) + lm (x)]  1fz>xgdx

 sup
z2B
ZB F 0k(p(x))  [ln (x)  lm (x)]  1fz>xgdx

+ jUn  Umj  sup
z2B
ZB F 0k(p(x))  1fz>xgdx

We successively have
sup
z2B
Z
B
jF 0k(p(x))[ln (x)  lm (x)]j  1 (x < z) dx  sup
z2B
Z
B
jF 0k(p(x))j  jln (x)  lm (x)j  1fz>xgdx

Z
B
jF 0k(p(x))j  jln (x)  lm (x)j dx
 k
Z
B
jln (x)  lm (x)j dx
 2bk sup
z2B
jln (z)  lm (z)j
= 2bk kln  lmk1
and
jUn  Umj  sup
z2B
ZB F 0k(p(x))  1 (x < z) dx
  kln  lmk1  sup
z2B
Z
B
jF 0k(p(x))j 1 (x < z) dx
 kln  lmk1 
Z
B
jF 0k(p(x))j dx
 2bk kln  lmk
Finally,
kOn Omk1  4bk kln  lmk1
For any , we can then choose  = =(4bk) so that kln  lmk1 <  implies kOn Omk1 < .
Hence, putting back the subscripts kl, Okl is a continuous mapping of l. Since l is a continuous
mapping of n, we have that Okl is also a continuous mapping of n.
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Lemma 11 The image Okl(N ) is a relatively compact subset of N .
Proof. By Arzela-Ascoli theorem, this is true if n 2 Okl(N ) are uniformly bounded and equicon-
tinuous on B. To say that n 2 Okl(N ) are uniformly bounded means that there existsM > 0 such that
knk1 = supz2B jn(z)j < M for all n 2 Okl(N ). This is true since Fk has image on [ 1=s; 1]. Therefore,
Okl generates functions n : B ! R such that n( b) = n(b) = 0 and n 2 [ 1=s; 1]. These functions
have image in [ 2n; 2b]. To say that n is equicontinuous on B means that for every  > 0 there exists
an  such that for every x; y 2 B and every n 2 N , we have jx  yj <  ) jn(x)  n(y)j < . This
follows from the continuity of n 2 C0(B).
To sum up, the set N is a closed convex set in the Banach space C0(B). The operator Okl : N ! N
is a continuous mapping such that Okl (N ) is a relatively compact subset of N . We can then apply
Schauder xed point theorem.
Lemma 12 For each k; l 2 N, there exists a xed point nkl 2 N such that nkl = Oklnkl.
Convergence
We now turn to the question about whether the sequence of xed points fnklgk;l2N converges to a
function that is also a xed point of (57). Because N is relatively compact and any nkl belongs to N ,
the sequence fnklgk;l2N converges uniformly on B to a function n1 2 N .
Note that F is a correspondence because F (0) = [ 1=s; 1]. In turn, the operator O : N ! N is a
correspondence. We therefore want to check whether n1 2 On1. Formally, we ask whether for any
 > 0, there exists a function n 2 On1 and two positive integers k and l such that we have
kOkln1   nk1 < 
for k > k and l > l:
We here assume that the sequence fHlgl2N converges to the sign function under the norm kk1.
Formally, for any  > 0, there exists l 2 N such that R jHl()  sign()j d < . Similarly, we assume
that fFkgk2N converges to F under the norm kk1. That is, for any  > 0, there exists k 2 N such thatR jFk()  F ()j d < . The last integral returns a scalar because the correspondence F returns a set
only on the zero measure set at  = 0.
Lemma 13 l converges to  uniformly under the norm kk1.
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Proof. The mapping l uniformly converges to the mapping  if for any  > 0, we can nd l such
that kl   k1   for all l > l. Note that kl   k1 = k( + )S   (1 + s) tLl   ( + )S + (1 + s) tLk1
= (1 + s) t kLl   Lk1. So, we just need to check the uniform convergence of the mapping Ll : N ! R,
Lln(z) =
R
BHl(n (x))  1fz>xgdx to the mapping Ln(z) =
R
B sign(n (x))  1fz>xgdx. By the denition of
the convergence for Hl, for any  > 0, we can nd l such that
R jHl ()  sign()j d   for all l > l.
Furthermore we have
kLl   Lk1 = sup
z2B
ZB [Hl(n (x))  sign(n (x))]  1fz>xgdx


Z
B
jHl(n (x))  sign(n (x))j dx
=
Z
jHl()  sign()j  M(x :   n (x) <  + d)d
 2b
Z
jHl()  sign()j d
 2b
whereM(E) denotes the measure of the set E  B so thatM(B) = 2b. So, for any 0, we can use the
above integer l for  = 0=2b and get kLl   Lk1 < 0 for all l > l. Therefore, Ll converges uniformly
to L. The same conclusion applies to l and . That is, the sequence flngl2N converges to n.
Let the function bF : R! [   1=s; 1] be such that bF () = 1 if  > 0; bF () = 0 if  = 0, andbF () =  1=s if  < 0. It is clear that bF 2 F and that fFkgk2N converges to bF under the norm kk1.
For any  > 0, there indeed exists k 2 N such that R1 1 Fk()  bF () d < . This is true because
fFkgk2N converges to F and
R1
 1
Fk()  bF () d = R1 1 jFk()  F ()j d since F and bF di¤er only
on a zero measure set.
Lemma 14 For any operator Z : N ! C0(B) and function n 2 N , RB Fk [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx converges
uniformly to
R
B
bF [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx under the norm kk1 and RB bF [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx 2 RB F [Zn(x)] 
1fz>xgdx.
Proof. We rst prove that for any  > 0 there exists a positive integer k 2 N such that
Ik =
ZB bF (Zn(x))  1fz>xgdx 
Z
B
Fk[Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx

1
< 
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for k > k. We indeed successively have
Ik =
ZB
n bF (Zn(x))  Fk[Zn(x)]o  1fz>xgdx
1
= sup
z2B
ZB
n bF (Zn(x))  Fk[Zn(x)]o  1fz>xgdx

Z
B
 bF (Zn(x))  Fk[Zn(x)] dx
=
Z  bF ()  Fk()  Mfx:Zn(x)<+dgd
whereME denotes the measure of a set E  B so thatMB = 2b. We can use the fact that the measure
is always smaller than 2b and get
Ik  2b
Z  bF ()  Fk() d
Finally, using the denition of convergence of Fk to bF , we can nd a positive integer k such thatR  bF ()  Fk() d < =2b, so that Ik   for any k > k.
We nally prove that
R
B
bF [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx 2 RB F [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx. For any z 2 B, we haveZ
B
bF [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx = Z bF ()  Mfx:x<z;Zn(x)<+d;Zn(x)6=0gd + 0  Mfx:x<z;Zn(x)=0gZ
B
F [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx =
Z
F ()  Mfx:x<z;Zn(x)<+d;Zn(x)6=0gd +
Z
F (0)  Mfx:x<z;:Zn(x)=0gd
whereME denotes the measure of a set E  B: For any z 2 B,Z
B
F [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx =
Z
B
bF [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx+ Z F (0)  Mfx:x<z;:Zn(x)=0gd
The last term in the RHS is equal to either f0g if Mfx:x<z;:Zn(x)=0g = 0 or the interval [ m=s;m]
where m = Mfx:x<z;:Zn(x)=0g if Mfx:x<z;:Zn(x)=0g > 0. It is then clear that
R
B F [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx 3R
B
bF [Zn(x)]  1fz>xgdx.
Given these lemmas, for any n 2 N and U 2 R, we get
lim
k!1
lim
l!1
Okln (z) = lim
k!1
lim
l!1
Z
B
Fk [U   0   ln (x)]  1fz>xgdx
= lim
k!1
Z
B
Fk
h
U   0  

lim
l!1
ln

(x)
i
 1fz>xgdx
= lim
k!1
Z
B
Fk [U   0   n (x)]  1fz>xgdx
=
Z
B
bF [U   0   n (x)]  1fz>xgdx
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where the second equality stems from the continuity of Fk, the third one from Lemma 13, and
the last one from Lemma 14. Also, from Lemma 14, we have
R
B
bF [U   0   n (x)]  1fz>xgdx 2R
B F [U   0   n (x)]  1fz>xgdx. So, limk!1 liml!1Okln (z) 2 On (z). Applying this to the xed
point solution n1 = limk!1 liml!1 n

kl and U

1 = limk!1 liml!1 U

kln

kl, we get n

1 = limk!1 liml!1Okln

1 2
On1. Hence, n

1 is a xed point of O, which proves Proposition 2.
Appendix C: Monocentric city
The proof makes uses of the following lemma.
Lemma 15 (i) SM is convex in [0; b) then concave in [b; b1) for some b 2 [0; b1) with S 0M(0) = 0. (ii)
SY is convex in (b1; b]. (iii) SM 2 C1 in the interval of [0; b] with S 0M(b1) < 0 and S 00M(b1   0) < 0 <
S 00M(b1 + 0).
Proof. (i) The access measure TM given by (18) can be written as
T 1 M (z) =
2
(   1) sf1  e
(1 )b1 cosh[(   1)z]g (59)
Because   cosh (z) is strictly concave and decreasing for z  0, so is T 1 M . As (lnT 1 M )00 =
[(T 1 M )
00T 1 M   (T 1 M )02]=T 2(1 )M < 0, lnT 1 M is strictly concave and decreasing for z  0, and so is
  lnTM(z). Di¤erentiating GM as given by (19), we successively get
G0M(z) =
1
s

 
Z z
 b1
e (z y)
T 1 M (y)
dy + 
Z b1
z
e (y z)
T 1 M (y)
dy

(60)
G00M(z) =

s


Z z
 b1
e (z y)
T 1 M (y)
dy + 
Z b1
z
e (y z)
T 1 M (y)
dy   2
T 1 M (z)

=

s

s2GM(z)  2
T 1 M (z)

Given the above expression of G00M and the fact 2=T
1 
M is strictly increasing for z  0, the curve
s2GM is convex (resp. concave) when above (resp. below) the curve 2=T 1 M . Two possibilities
actually arise: s2GM is either concave and below the curve 2=T 1 M or there exists some b 2 (0; b1)
such that s2GM is convex on [0; b] and concave on [b; b1] with b necessarily corresponding to the
single intersection point of s2GM with the curve 2=T 1 M . See the illustration in Figure A1. It can
also be shown that S 0M(0) = G
0
M(0) = (  lnTM)0(0) = 0.
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(ii) We now prove that SM is convex in (b1; b]. For x 2 (b1; b], we have
GM(x) =
1
s
Z b1
 b1
e (x y)
T 1 M (y)
dy
G0M(x) =  

s
Z b1
 b1
e (x y)
T 1 M (y)
dy < 0
G00M(x) =
 2
s
Z b1
 b1
e (x y)
T 1 M (y)
dy > 0 (61)
and
lnTM(x) = x+
1
1   ln

1
s
Z b1
 b1
e (1 )ydy

which is linear in x. Hence, SM is convex in (b1; b].
(iii) We showed that   lnTM(z) is concave, decreasing and C1 on [0; b]. For z ! b1   0, we have
G0M(b1   0) =  

s
Z b1
 b1
e (b1 y)
T 1 M (y)
dy < 0
G00M(b1   0) =

s


Z b1
 b1
e (b1 y)
T 1 M (y)
dy   2
T 1 M (b1)

< 0
as GM is concave in z = b1 by part (i). For z ! b1 + 0, we have
G0M(b1 + 0) =  

s
Z b1
 b1
e (b1 y)
T 1 M (y)
dy < 0
G00M(b1 + 0) =
 2
s
Z b1
 b1
e (b1 y)
T 1 M (y)
dy > 0
by using expression (61). Therefore, S 0M(b1   0) = S 0M(b1 + 0) but S 00M(b1   0) < 0 < S 00M(b1 + 0). So,
SM is C1 on [0; b]. It also appears that S 0M(b1) < 0.
INSERT FIGURE A1 HERE
Figure A1: Concavity and convexity of GM :
Note: The gure represents s2GM and 2=TM with plain and dashed curves respectively.
Parameters: left panel:  = 3,  = 1, s = 1; right panel  = 6,  = 2; s = 1.
We now show that the equilibrium conditions 	b(y)  	r(y) for all y 2 [0; b1] and 	r(x)  	b(x)
for all x 2 [b1; b] can be reduced to 	b(0)  	r(0) and 	b(b)  	r(b) = 0 respectively.
Proof. In the interval of [0; b], the bid rents of residents and rms are given by
	r(y) = 	r(0)  ty
	b(y) =
1
s

( + )SM(y) + ty +

 ln

e
+  ln

e
  U0 + c0

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Given Lemma 15(i), 	b is convex in [0; b) then concave in [b; b1) for some b 2 [0; b1) with 	0b(0) = t.
Therefore 	b(y)   	r(y) is quasiconcave on [0; b1]. As 	b(b1) = 	r(b1), the equilibrium condition
	b(y)  	r(y) for all y 2 [0; b1] reduces to 	b(0)  	r(0). According to Lemma 15(ii), 	b(z) is convex
for z 2 [b1; b]. As 	r(z) is linear and 	b(b1) = 	r(b1), the equilibrium condition 	b(x)  	r(x) for all
x 2 [b1; b] reduces to 	b(b)  	r(b) = 0.
Appendix D: Integrated city
We show that jS 0I(b)j  jS 0I(z)j, 8z 2 [0; b].
Proof. Given the similarity of expression of TI (25) with that corresponding to the monocentric
case (18), the argument used in Appendix A showing that lnT 1 M is strictly concave and decreasing
in z in Appendix A, can be applied here. Thus,   ln(TI) is strictly concave and decreasing for y  0.
By di¤erentiating GI(z) as given by expression (26), we get
G0I(z) =
1
 (1 + s)

 
Z z
 b
e (z y)
T 1 I (y)
dy + 
Z b
z
e (y z)
T 1 I (y)
dy

=

1 + s
Z z
 b
e (z y)
T 1 I (y)
dy +
Z b
z
e (y z)
T 1 I (y)
dy   2
Z z
 b
e (z y)
T 1 I (y)
dy

=

1 + s

 (1 + s)GI(z)  2
Z z
 b
e (z y)
T 1 I (y)
dy

G00I (z) =

1 + s

(1 + s) 2GI(z)  2
T 1 I (z)

It su¢ ces to show that G0I(b) +G
0
I(z)  0 in order to have
jG0I(b)j  jG0I(z)j , 8z 2 [0; b] (62)
48
as G0I(b) < 0. To show that G
0
I(b) +G
0
I(z)  0, we develop G0I(b) +G0I(z) into

1 + s

 (1 + s) [GI(b) +GI(z)]  2
Z b
 b
e (b y)
T 1 I (y)
dy   2
Z z
 b
e (z y)
T 1 I (y)
dy

=

1 + s
Z b
 b
e (b y)
T 1 I (y)
dy +
Z z
 b
e (z y)
T 1 I (y)
dy +
Z b
z
e (y z)
T 1 I (y)
dy   2
Z b
 b
e (b y)
T 1 I (y)
dy   2
Z z
 b
e (z y)
T 1 I (y)
dy

=

1 + s
Z b
z
e (y z)
T 1 I (y)
dy  
Z b
 b
e (b y)
T 1 I (y)
dy  
Z z
 b
e (z y)
T 1 I (y)
dy

=

1 + s
Z b
z
e (y z)
T 1 I (y)
dy  
Z z
 b
e (b y)
T 1 I (y)
dy  
Z b
z
e (b y)
T 1 I (y)
dy  
Z z
 b
e (z y)
T 1 I (y)
dy

=

1 + s
Z b
z
e (y z)   e (b y)
T 1 I (y)
dy  
Z z
 b
e (b y)
T 1 I (y)
dy  
Z z
 b
e (z y)
T 1 I (y)
dy

As T 1 I is decreasing for z  0, we have
R b
z
(e (y z)  e (b y))=T 1 I (y)dy  0, 8z  0, because the
increasing function e (y z) is the reected image of e (b y) over the line y = (z+ b)=2. This proves
G0I(b) +G
0
I(z)  0. Finally, using the fact that   lnTI is strictly concave and decreasing and relation
(62) leads to
jS 0I(b)j  jS 0I(z)j , 8z 2 [0; b]
Also, note that S 0I(b) < 0 as both G
0
I(b) and  (lnTI)0(b) are negative. Therefore, SI(z) is concave and
decreasing in the neighborhood of z = b:
We next prove that tI is an increasing function of  .
Proof. We need to show that S 0I(b) is a decreasing function of  . First, it can be shown that
d
  (lnT )0 (b) =d =  1. Second, by using expression (26) we haveG0I(b) =  =(1+s) R b b e (b z)=T 1 I (z)dz
and
d
d
G0I(b) =  
1
1 + s
Z b
 b
e (b z)
T 1 I (z)
dz +

1 + s
Z b
 b
(b  z)e (b z)
T 1 I (z)
dz   
1 + s
Z b
 b
e (b z)
d
d
T  1I (z)dz
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As d[T 1 I (z)]=d < 0, it su¢ ces to show that the sum of the rst two terms is negative. We have
  1
1 + s
Z b
 b
e (b z)
T 1 I (z)
dz +

1 + s
Z b
 b
(b  z)e (b z)
T 1 I (z)
dz
=
1
1 + s
Z b
 b
[(b  z)   1]e (b z)T  1I (z)dz
=
1
(1 + s)
Z 2b
0
(r   1)e rT  1I [b  r=()]dr
=
1
(1 + s)
Z 1
0
+
Z 2b
1

(r   1)e rT  1I [b  r=()]dr
 T
 1
I [b  1=()]
(1 + s)
Z 1
0
+
Z 2b
1

(r   1)e rdr < 0
as T  1I [b  r=()] a decreasing function of r and
R R
0
(r   1)e rdr < 0.
Appendix E: Cut-o¤s tM and tI
We prove that lims!0 tM < lims!0 tI . As s  ! 0, tM = tM = ( + )  . We need to check that
(lnTI)
0(b) G0I(b) > 
when s! 0. Given the expressions (25), (26) of T 1 I and G0I , we have
(lnTI)
0(b) =
1
1  
d
dz
ln

1  e(1 )b cosh[(   1)z]
z=b
= 
e(1 )b sinh[(   1)z]
1  e(1 )b cosh[(   1)z]

z=b
= 
and
G0I(b) =  
(   1)  2
2
Z b
 b
e (b y)
1  e(1 )b cosh[(   1)y]dy
where G0I(b) is negative because the denominator of this integrand is positive as
1  e(1 )b cosh[(   1)z]  1  e(1 )b e
( 1)b + e ( 1)b
2
= 1  1 + e
 2( 1)b
2
=
1  e 2( 1)b
2
> 0
Hence, we get (lnTI)0(b) G0I(b) >  .
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Appendix F: Proof of Corollary 2
We show that the partially integrated city is a spatial equilibrium for t = tI    and small enough
 > 0. By continuity, SP (z) tends to SI(z) for any z when b1 tends to b. This is also true for S 0P (z)
and S 00P (z). It is shown in Appendix D that SI(z) is decreasing and concave in the neighborhood of
z = b and jS 0I(b)j > jS 0I(z)j, z 2 [0; b]. Hence, we have S 0P (z) < 0 and S 00P (z) < 0 for z close enough to
b while jS 0P (b)j > jS 0P (z)j, 8z 2 [0; b]. By continuity, jS 0P (b1)j > jS 0P (z)j, 8z 2 [0; b1] when b1 tends to
b. In this case, SP (z) is decreasing and concave in z within the intervals [b1; b] for small  > 0. So, by
concavity of SP (z), we compute
tP  min
y2[b1;b2]
 + 
1 + s
SP (y)  SP (b2)
b2   y =
 + 
1 + s
SP (b1)  SP (b2)
b2   b1etP   + 
1 + s
SP (b2)  SP (b)
b  b2btP   + 
1 + s
max
z2[0;b1)
jS 0P (z)j =
 + 
1 + s
jS 0P (b1)j
while
t =
 + 
1 + s
SP (b1)  SP (b2)
b2   b1
We now check that btP  t  min(tP ;etP ). Indeed, t = tP and btP  t  etP by concavity of SP (z).
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Figure 1: Spatial urban structures
(         : firms and         : households)
(a) Monocentric city
(c) Partially integrated city (d) Duocentric city
b1 b
bbb1 b2 b1 b2 b3
-b -b1
-b -b2 -b1 -b3 -b2 -b1-b
(b) Integrated city
b-b
Figure 2: Monocentric city: residential (blue) and business (red) bid rents.
Figure 3: Integrated city: residential (blue) and business (red) bid rents.
Figure 4: Partially integrated city: residential (blue) and business (red) bid rents.
Panel a: balanced use of space, s=1 Panel b: unbalanced use of space, s=0.01
Figure 5: Duocentric city: residential (blue) and business (red) bid rents.
Panel a): Duocentric equilibrium 1 Panel b): Duocentric equilibrium 2
Figure 6: Monocentric (m), partially integrated (p), integrated (i), and duocentric configurations in (τ,t) plane
(α=β=γ=s=1 and σ=3)
τ
tI
t
tM
Figure 7: Aggregate welfare of urban configurations 
in terms of transport cost τ for various values of commuting cost t
Figure 8: City structure as population size increases
The horizontal axis is population and the vertical axis location. Diagonal straight lines display city borders. Residential districts
are represented in white, monocentric business districts in grey, duocentric business districts in red, and the business and the
integrated districts of the partially integrated city in plain and dash blue respectively. Overlaps indicate multiple equilibria.
Figure A1: Concavity and convexity of GM
ετσ²GM (resp. 2/TM
1-σ) is represented by the plain (resp. the dashed) curve
Left panel: σ=3, τ=1, ε=1; right panel σ=6, τ=2, ε=1
